Substantive Due Process and the Politicization of the Supreme Court by Millman, Eric
Claremont Colleges
Scholarship @ Claremont
CMC Senior Theses CMC Student Scholarship
2018
Substantive Due Process and the Politicization of
the Supreme Court
Eric Millman
This Open Access Senior Thesis is brought to you by Scholarship@Claremont. It has been accepted for inclusion in this collection by an authorized
administrator. For more information, please contact scholarship@cuc.claremont.edu.
Recommended Citation
Millman, Eric, "Substantive Due Process and the Politicization of the Supreme Court" (2018). CMC Senior Theses. 1905.
http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses/1905
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Claremont McKenna College 
 
 
Substantive Due Process and the Politicization of the 
Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted to 
Professor Ralph Rossum 
 
 
 
By 
Eric Millman 
 
 
 
 
for 
Senior Thesis 
Fall 2017 and Spring 2018 
April 23rd, 2018 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 Substantive due process is one of the most cherished and elusive doctrines in 
American constitutional jurisprudence. The understanding that the Constitution of the 
United States protects not only specifically enumerated rights, but also broad concepts 
such as “liberty,” “property,” and “privacy,” forms the foundation for some of the 
Supreme Court’s most impactful—and controversial—decisions.  
This thesis explores the constitutional merits and politicizing history of natural 
rights jurisprudence from its application in Dred Scott v. Sandford to its recent evocation 
in Obergefell v. Hodges. Indeed, from slavery to same-same sex marriage, substantive 
due process has played a pivotal role in shaping our nation’s laws and destiny: But was it 
ever intended to? 
 This paper first examines the legal arguments in favor of substantive due process 
to determine whether the judiciary was designed to be the “bulwark” of natural as well as 
clearly scribed law. Then, employing a novel framework to measuring judicial 
politicization, the thesis tracks the doctrine’s application throughout its most prominent 
case studies. Often arriving at nuanced conclusions, we observe that the truth is more 
often painted in some gradation of grey than in black or white.  
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Section One: Introduction 
 
Initial Remarks 
The notion that the Supreme Court—and the judiciary generally—is (or should be) 
apolitical is grounded in the institution’s historical origins and has long been widely 
viewed as critical to its legitimacy. In Federalist No. 78, Alexander Hamilton made the 
duty of the federal court system clear: 
The interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar province of the courts. A 
constitution is, in fact, and must be regarded by the judges, as a fundamental 
law. It therefore belongs to them to ascertain its meaning, as well as the 
meaning of any particular act proceeding from the legislative body. If there 
should happen to be an irreconcilable variance between the two, that which has 
the superior obligation and validity ought, of course, to be preferred; or, in other 
words, the Constitution ought to be preferred to the statute, the intention of the 
people to the intention of their agents.1 
 
Furthermore, Hamilton wrote that courts “are to be considered as the bulwarks of a 
limited Constitution against legislative encroachments” and that the “independent spirit” 
of judges is “essential to the faithful performance of so arduous a duty.”2 Due to justices’ 
manner of appointment and confirmation, lifetime tenure, and other factors, the judiciary 
is deliberately designed to be insulated from the swings of public opinion, whims of the 
masses, and pressure of legislators.  
  It is important for the Supreme Court to be viewed as politically agnostic in large 
part because of its power of judicial review: Since it is the Supreme Court that has the 
power to define the scope of legislative and executive power under the Constitution, it is 
                                                 
1 Alexander Hamilton, "The Federalist Papers: No. 78," The Avalon Project: Federalist No 78, Accessed 
January 19, 2018, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/fed78.asp.  
2 Ibid.  
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critical that the Court be perceived as a neutral arbiter. An ultimate tribunal that is closely 
tied to a political party or cause is an umpire drawn from the ranks of the home team—
little time is likely to elapse before the boo’s start, the game erupts in chaos, and the final 
score is dismissed as illegitimate.  
As a deliberately unrepresentative body, the Supreme Court’s legitimacy, unlike 
that of Congress and the executive branch, does not depend on success at the ballot box. 
Insofar as the American form of government rests upon the principle that ultimate power 
is to be earned through democratic processes, the Supreme Court has no clear and 
credible purpose other than as an ostensibly impartial arbiter of the law. For this reason, 
politicization of the Supreme Court has long been decried as antithetical to its role within 
our governmental scheme.  
History, too, provides strong support to the notion that excessive association with 
a political or partisan cause has the potential to undermine the legitimacy of the Court. A 
string of judicial decisions striking down parts of the New Deal did, in fact, precipitate 
President Franklin Roosevelt’s “court-packing” plan,3 which, if implemented, had the 
potential to seriously undermine the independence of the Court. President Roosevelt’s 
arguments in favor of the plan suggest the inherent dangers for the Court when it blurs 
the lines (or is perceived to blur the lines) between judicial interpretation and public 
policy making. In defending the court-packing plan, Roosevelt stated: 
The Courts, however, have cast doubts on the ability of the elected Congress to 
protect us against catastrophe by meeting squarely our modern social and 
economic conditions. . . . The Court has been acting not as a judicial body, but as 
a policy-making body. . . . We have, therefore, reached the point as a nation 
                                                 
3 The History Channel, "Roosevelt Announces "court-packing" Plan," History.com, 
https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/roosevelt-announces-court-packing-plan. 
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where we must take action to save the Constitution from the Court and the Court 
from itself. We must find a way to take an appeal from the Supreme Court to the 
Constitution itself.4  
 
Roosevelt’s assertion that he, alongside Congress, needed to “save the Court from itself” 
lost favor with the American public and, luckily, his plan was never implemented. 
However, hindsight affords us the opportunity to clearly see the slippery slope such a 
road could have paved.  
Politicization of the Supreme Court not only undermines its institutional 
legitimacy—it also often accords the Court a public policymaking role that it is uniquely 
unsuited to perform. Courts have no easily accessible mechanism for tapping wide-
ranging outside expertise, incorporating the diverse spectrum of views held by the 
American public, or regularly “tweaking” policy in order to address the multitude of 
minute dilemmas that might arise following implementation. Furthermore, members of 
the Court are appointed for life, and its composition is refreshed with “young blood” only 
periodically (although, to be fair, Congressional seats cannot be said to have high 
turnover, either). The judicial review process is time-consuming, shielded from public 
opinion (at least in theory), and highly bureaucratic. As such, courts are well-suited for 
the independent adjudication of particular laws or disputes and especially poor at crafting 
public policy.  
While the Constitution ultimately rejects a model that provides the Supreme Court 
a political role, even the most cursory analysis suggests that the institution—from its 
                                                 
4 Franklin Delano Roosevelt, "Fireside Chat on Reorganization of the Judiciary," FDR: Fireside Chat on 
Judicial Reorganization, Accessed January 19, 2018, 
http://xroads.virginia.edu/~ma02/volpe/newdeal/court_fireside_text.html. 
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earliest incarnation through to its most recent rulings—has both helped form and been 
shaped by the partisan politics of its times. Indeed, political controversy surrounding our 
nation’s highest court is no modern phenomenon. This is perhaps most easily illustrated 
by considering one of the earliest and most important Supreme Court decisions: Marbury 
vs. Madison (1803).  
Marbury, most famous for establishing the principle of judicial review, also 
illustrates the abiding power of politics to insert itself into judicial decision-making. The 
case arose from a “court packing” exercise not dissimilar in its objective (albeit on a 
much smaller scale) from that contemplated by President Roosevelt. The Judiciary Act of 
1801 created a substantial number of new judgeships that President Adams proceeded to 
fill with Federalists in an effort to preserve his party’s control of the judiciary.5 William 
Marbury, among the last to be appointed, did not receive his commission before the 
opposition party, led by Thomas Jefferson, took over the Presidency.6 When the new 
Secretary of State, James Madison, refused to honor the appointment at the direction of 
the newly elected Anti-Federalist President, Marbury requested the Court to issue a writ 
of mandamus to force the new administration to deliver his commission.7 In 1803 as well 
as today, Americans have always been willing to put up a vigorous fight when it comes to 
their paychecks. 
Indeed, from Marbury on, the Supreme Court has rightfully ruled on hundreds of 
fundamental questions that strike to the very heart of the nation’s most pressing public 
                                                 
5 History.com staff, "Marbury v. Madison," History.com, Published in 2009 and accessed November 20, 
2017, https://www.history.com/topics/marbury-v-madison.  
6 Ibid.  
7 Ibid.  
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policy debates. This is the heavy duty and responsibility of the federal judiciary. That 
Supreme Court decisions have political repercussions is inevitable: The very power of 
judicial review presupposes judicial intervention in—and, as necessary, over-ruling of—
political decisions. The Court has rightfully played a pivotal role in a wide range of the 
country’s most important and controversial policy issues including (but not limited to) 
slavery, desegregation, the death penalty, affirmative action, pornography, gun rights, and 
voting rights. It has done so in the course of interpreting a multitude of constitutional 
provisions, including those related to its own jurisdiction (as in Marbury vs. Madison), 
the Commerce Clause (as in any number of decisions invalidating various New Deal 
programs), and each of the amendments in the Bill of Rights. However, because there is 
little textual or historical basis for the concept of substantive due process, the doctrine 
occupies a special place in the politicization of the Supreme Court.  
Thus, this paper explores the role of substantive due process in the politicization 
of the Supreme Court throughout American constitutional history. The first job in so 
ambitious an exercise is to define what is meant by politicization, explore its nature, and 
provide some criteria by which its prominence in an institution such as the Supreme 
Court (and the judiciary more generally) can be measured. This, alongside application of 
the developed methodology to the present day, is the focus of Section One of this thesis.  
The second critical task is to explore the origins and constitutional merits of 
substantive due process as well as its relationship to more general approaches to legal 
interpretation (Section Two). In addition, I shall also trace the history of the doctrine’s 
application through the decisions of the Court (Section Three), especially as those 
decisions are, or were perceived to be, fundamentally political.  
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Finally, after providing a holistic view of substantive due process in American 
jurisprudence, Section Four will return us to the present day. In doing so, it expounds 
how the currently politicized state of the Supreme Court (especially with respect to the 
doctrine) may be addressed moving forward. First, however, it is worth examining how to 
measure judicial polarization and apply that metric to the contemporary landscape of the 
federal judiciary generally and the Supreme Court in particular.  
Politicization of the Supreme Court: A 2018 Status Check  
Defining what, precisely, is meant by the “politicization” of the Supreme Court is 
a more difficult task than it might initially seem. At first glance, one is tempted to employ 
an approach similar to that of Justice Potter Stewart’s test for recognizing obscenity in the 
Supreme Court’s 1964 case, Jacobellis v. Ohio: “I know it when I see it.”8 
Unfortunately, a bit more specificity is needed for the purposes of this paper. 
While more formal statistical modes of measurement will be addressed, the working 
definition used in this thesis assesses the degree of politicization of the Supreme Court 
using five interrelated factors:   
● The degree to which the Court makes controversial decisions that are important to 
the public and inconsistent with the strongly held views of a not insubstantial 
sector of the public, based on a rationale that is obscure. 
● The extent to which the Supreme Court deviates (or appears to deviate) from 
established precedent or modes of judicial interpretation to reach a particular 
result in cases that have broad political implications.     
● The extent to which Supreme Court composition is the focus of political 
processes, including election rhetoric and voting priorities.  
● The extent to which Supreme Court nomination and confirmation is subject to a 
political litmus test, especially at the expense of judicial qualifications and 
expertise.  
                                                 
8 Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) 
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● The degree to which Supreme Court justices are polarized along the legal 
spectrum.   
 
By these measures, the Supreme Court of 2018 is extraordinarily politicized. While the 
first and second factors will be addressed at length throughout the historical analysis 
section, this chapter examines the following three in depth.  
As an introduction, however, the first two factors are described at length in the 
context of cases involving abortion, homosexuality, and other social hot button issues. In 
these decisions, substantive due process in particular has been a primary (and largely 
unjustifiable) mechanism for the Court to insert itself into the resolution of issues that are 
often fundamentally nonjusticiable, resulting in the alienation of a significant sector of 
social conservatives.  
From the standpoint of liberals, however, perhaps the best illustration of the 
Supreme Court reversing established modes was demonstrated by the majority decision 
in Bush v. Gore (2000). This case held that there was an Equal Protection Clause 
violation in using different standards of counting presidential votes for different Florida 
counties.9 As a result, many Democrats railed the conservative block for alleged 
hypocrisy at best and outright judicial activism at worst in employing a stringent reading 
of a clause that is typically relished by liberals to “give” the Republican candidate, 
George W. Bush, the election.10 As such, it can hardly be said that only the conservative 
                                                 
9 Elspeth Reeve, "Just How Bad Was Bush v. Gore?" The Atlantic, November 29, 2010, accessed 
December 20, 2018, https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2010/11/just-how-bad-was-bush-v-
gore/343247/.  
10 Ibid.  
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camp openly criticizes the Court’s decisions as political. Of course, this will also be 
demonstrated historically, especially with respect to the Lochner era.  
However, in line with the third factor outlined, the degree to which the 
contemporary federal judiciary has been politicized is perhaps best illustrated by the 2016 
presidential election (and its subsequent aftermath). In a Sacramento Bee article titled 
“It’s the Nukes, Not the Supreme Court,” lifelong Republican and Roy P. Crocker 
Professor of American Politics at Claremont McKenna College John J. Pitney describes 
the difficulty of his decision not to vote along party lines for the first time in 35 years: 
To anybody who says that the argument stops with the words, “Supreme Court,” I 
offer two other words: “nuclear weapons.” The power to nominate justices is 
important, but the power to wipe out all life on earth is even more important. 
Maybe he doesn’t pine for Armageddon, but his [Mr. Trump’s] big mouth could 
start a crisis that spins out of control.11 
 
Pitney continues to list the many reasons why the soon-to-be President-elect is unfit for 
office. However, what is relevant to this thesis is not the fact that an unpolished, former 
reality TV star became the 45th President of the United States: it is the degree to which 
voters weighed the importance of the Supreme Court at the ballot box.  
During the 2016 presidential campaign, People for the American Way, a left-wing 
advocacy group, stated that “for the future of the Supreme Court, and for the rights of all 
Americans, November 8, 2016, is truly judgment day.”12 The group compiled a 
comprehensive report outlining the major areas in which the courts recently had—and 
                                                 
11 John J. Pitney Jr, "It's the Nukes, Not the Supreme Court," The Sacramento Bee, August 11, 2016, 
Accessed March 19, 2018, http://www.sacbee.com/opinion/op-ed/article94872637.html. 
12 People For the American Way, "Judgment Day 2016: The Future of the Supreme Court as a Critical Issue 
in the 2016 Presidential Election," People For the American Way, September 2015, Accessed February 19, 
2018, http://www.pfaw.org/report/judgment-day-2016-the-future-of-the-supreme-court-as-a-critical-issue-
in-the-2016-presidential-election/.  
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would continue to have—a tremendous role in determining public policy, namely: money 
and politics; civil and voting rights; LGBT rights; as well as reproductive freedom and 
women’s rights.13 While jurisprudence concerning these areas rests on a variety of federal 
laws and constitutional provisions, several cases have undoubtedly been decided on a 
conception of “natural rights” allegedly grounded in the Fourteenth and other 
Amendments. 
 The Democratic presidential candidate herself reinforced strong rhetoric 
surrounding the Supreme Court. In the third presidential debate, Hillary Clinton made her 
stance clear:  
We need a Supreme Court that will stand up on behalf of women's rights, on 
behalf of the rights of the LGBT community, that will stand up and say “no” to 
Citizens United, a decision that has undermined the election system in our country 
because of the way it permits dark, unaccountable money to come into our 
electoral system.14 
 
In addition, during an interview on the Tom Joyner Morning Show, Clinton pledged to 
“look broadly and widely for people who represent the diversity of our country.”15 As 
such, while it is surely not an exclusively 21st century phenomenon, it is clear candidates 
want their judicial nominations (particularly those to the Supreme Court) to reflect their 
own political and social views. 
                                                 
13 Ibid.  
14 Veronica Stracqualursi, "What Hillary Clinton Wants in a Supreme Court Justice," ABC News, October 
24, 2016, Accessed October 14, 2017, http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/hillary-clinton-supreme-court-
justice/story?id=43014620.  
15 Ibid. 
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 On the other hand, then-candidate Trump promised to appoint judges who would 
“protect the Second Amendment”16 and largely follow in Justice Scalia’s footsteps.17 And 
while it is no secret that presidents have long nominated justices who are likely to rule in 
their favor, it is rather shocking to examine how many prominent party leaders, 
conservative organizations, and registered Republicans supported Trump solely over the 
issue of the federal judiciary. 
For example, former Republican primary candidate and Senator Ted Cruz (R-
TX), who once called Mr. Trump a “pathological liar,”18 eventually supported the 
Republican nominee largely due to the perceived threat Hillary Clinton’s nominees 
would pose to the conservative agenda:19 
For anyone concerned about the Bill of Rights—free speech, religious liberty, the 
Second Amendment—the Court hangs in the balance. We are only one justice 
away from losing our most basic rights, and the next president will appoint as 
many as four new justices. We know, without a doubt, that every Clinton 
appointee would be a left-wing ideologue.20 
 
Former Speaker of the House John Boehner (R-OH) had a similar stance on why he 
would be supporting Mr. Trump. In his mind, the decision was “pretty simple:”21  
The legislative process, the political process, is at a standstill and will be 
regardless of who wins. The only thing that really matters over the next four 
                                                 
16 Politico Staff, "Full Transcript: Third 2016 Presidential Debate," Politico, October 20, 2016, Accessed 
November 20, 2018, https://www.politico.com/story/2016/10/full-transcript-third-2016-presidential-debate-
230063.  
17 Meet the Press, "Trump on Picking a Scalia Replacement," NBCNews.com, February 14, 2016, Accessed 
January 20, 2018, https://www.nbcnews.com/meet-the-press/video/trump-on-picking-a-scalia-replacement-
622796355543.  
18 Timothy P. Carney, "The 'but Judges!' Argument for Trump, and Why It Fails," Washington Examiner, 
September 27, 2016, Accessed November 19, 2017, http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/the-but-judges-
argument-for-trump-and-why-it-fails/article/2603011. 
19 Ibid.  
20 Ibid.  
21 Russell Berman, "Why the Supreme Court Matters More to Republicans than Trump," The Atlantic, 
October 14, 2016, Accessed October 19, 2017, https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/10/why-
the-supreme-court-matters-more-to-republicans-than-trump/504038/.  
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years or eight years is who is going to appoint the next Supreme Court 
nominees…. The biggest impact any president can have on American society 
and on the American economy is who is on that court.22 
 
While unfortunate, the classic establishment Republican who, in any other election year, 
would have no business voting for Donald Trump, was precisely correct. With the 
legislative arena gridlocked to the teeth, the judicial branch presented the next best 
avenue to accomplish a political agenda. Mr. Trump recognized the Court’s importance 
and, just four months before the election, articulated it loud and clear (in typical fashion, 
speaking in third person) at a campaign stop in Cedar Rapids: 
If you really like Donald Trump, that's great, but if you don't, you have to vote 
for me anyway. You know why? Supreme Court judges, Supreme Court 
judges. Have no choice, sorry, sorry, sorry. You have no choice.23 
 
It is undoubtedly clear that interest groups, the party establishment, and, most 
importantly, the American public were listening.  
According to exit polls, 21% of voters considered the Supreme Court to be the 
“most important factor” when deciding how to cast their votes in the presidential 
election.24 Of this group, 56% supported Mr. Trump.25 Another 48% of voters considered 
the factor to be “important.”26 In an election where the President-elect lost the popular 
vote, it is possible that those who felt that they were voting (albeit indirectly) for a more 
conservative Supreme Court may have made the difference.  
                                                 
22 Ibid., Emphasis added in bold.  
23 David Frum, "The Supreme Court Isn't a Sufficient Reason to Vote for Trump," The Atlantic, August 04, 
2016, Accessed November 5, 2017, https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/08/scotus-not-a-
good-reason-to-vote-trump/494630/. Emphasis added in bold.  
24 CNN, "Exit Polls," CNN Politics, November 23, 2016, Accessed January 14, 2018, 
https://www.cnn.com/election/2016/results/exit-polls. 
25 Ibid.  
26 Ibid.  
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It should be noted that some legal scholars regard the prominence of the 
composition of the Supreme Court as an election issue as appropriate and positive. For 
example, when I asked CNN senior legal analyst Jeffrey Toobin at Claremont McKenna 
College in January 2018 about election rhetoric surrounding the judiciary, the frequent 
television commentator spoke at length about how Americans should, in fact, be voting 
for representatives who they believe will protect their rights. For this reason, 
consideration of representatives’ views regarding Supreme Court justices is appropriate.  
While a compelling case at first glance, this assertion presupposes that individuals 
take the time to seriously consider whether their most cherished “rights” are, in fact, 
constitutionally mandated. At best, Toobin’s picture is a rosy one. Americans are using 
the democratic process to help protect the rule of law, rights of minorities, and other 
constitutional provisions. At worst, the public—and their representatives—undermine the 
sovereignty and integrity of the judicial branch in order to enact public policy under the 
guise of legitimate legal interpretation.  
Regardless of whether the composition of the Supreme Court should or should not 
play so prominent a role in election politics, it is clear that the degree of attention focused 
on this issue in the 2016 presidential election is atypical and indicative of the public’s 
strong sense that the Supreme Court has failed to keep itself above the political fray. As 
William G. Ross of the Samford University's Cumberland School of Law noted in an 
academic commentary published in October 2012,27 the Supreme Court had been an 
important election issue only four times in the past 100 years. According to Ross, the 
                                                 
27 William G. Ross, "The Supreme Court Should Be a Key Election Issue," JURIST - Forum, October 31, 
2012, Accessed October 21, 2017, http://www.jurist.org/forum/2012/10/william-ross-scotus-election.php.  
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judiciary “has emerged as an important campaign issue only when the Court has alienated 
a distinct bloc of voters with a broad range of issues.”28 In 1912 and 1924, the public 
backlashed in response to the Court's nullification of progressive economic policies.29 In 
1964 and 1968, the Warren Court's "liberal" decisions regarding the rights of criminal 
defendants, racial desegregation, school-sponsored prayer, and voting district populations 
became major election issues.30 In these elections, the Republican nominees (Barry 
Goldwater and Richard Nixon, respectively) pledged to appoint justices who would 
exercise judicial restraint.31 And, while this thesis argues that today’s importance of the 
Supreme Court as an election issue is in large part due to the institution’s expanded use of 
substantive due process over the last several decades, the point nonetheless holds that it is 
particularly prevalent compared to historical standards. 
The third factor in assessing politicization relates to the degree to which the 
appointment and confirmation of justices is subject to political manipulation that is 
transparent to the public, as well as the extent to which political “litmus tests” are used in 
vetting Supreme Court nominees. Following Justice Antonin Scalia’s death on February 
13, 2016, Democrats were appalled when the majority Republican Senate refused to hold 
hearings on President Obama’s nominee, Chief Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia Justice Merrick Garland.  
                                                 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid.  
30 Ibid.  
31 Ibid.  
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A study conducted by Professors Bradley Kar and Jason Mazzone deemed the 
“snub” unprecedented in the nation’s constitutional history.32 According to the study, in 
all 103 cases where an elected president faced a Supreme Court vacancy before his 
successor’s election, he successfully nominated and appointed a replacement Justice.33 To 
add gas to the flame, Senate Minority Leader Harry Reid (D-NV) said that his 
Republican counterpart, Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-KY), refused to 
hold a hearing on Garland due to pressure from the billionaire Koch brothers.34 And 
while there is some debate whether the Republic action was truly as categorically novel 
as the Kar and Mazzone report argues,35 the politicization of the judicial appointment was 
clear. According to a poll by NBC News and the Wall Street Journal, 36 more than half of 
registered voters disapproved of the Republican action, while Senator Elizabeth Warren 
denounced the act as an “insult to the Constitution” and one that morphed a solemn 
Senatorial duty into a “crazy political process.”37 If nothing else, this failed appointment 
provides ample evidence that the Supreme Court—along with the rest of the federal 
judiciary—is now viewed by Congress not as a third and equal arm of government, but as 
an effective tool for creating, maintaining, and overruling public policy. 
                                                 
32 Robin Bradley Kar and Jason Mazzone, "The Garland Affair: What History and the Constitution Really 
Say About President Obama’s Powers to Appoint a Replacement for Justice Scalia," SSRN Electronic 
Journal, May 2016, 53-62, Accessed December 7, 2017, doi:10.2139/ssrn.2752287.  
33 Ibid., 53. 
34 Louis Nelson, "Harry Reid Won't Rule out Hardball Tactics in Merrick Garland Fight," Politico, August 
11, 2016, Accessed October 15, 2018, https://www.politico.com/story/2016/08/harry-reid-merrick-garland-
226919.  
35 Adam Liptak, "Study Calls Snub of Obama's Supreme Court Pick Unprecedented," The New York Times, 
June 13, 2016, Accessed October 17, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/14/us/politics/obama-
supreme-court-merrick-garland.html.  
36 Reena Flores, "Elizabeth Warren: GOP Obstruction on SCOTUS Pick an "insult"," CBS News, March 17, 
2016, Accessed October 18, 2017, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/elizabeth-warren-obama-supreme-
court-nominee-election-2016/.  
37 Ibid.  
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Some political pundits argue that President Trump’s most lasting legacy in the 
policy arena will not be his southern border wall, tax reform, or repeal of the Affordable 
Care Act’s individual mandate, but the degree to which he has shaped (and will continue 
to shape) the composition of the federal courts. After winning election, Trump nominated 
more federal appeals judges to the bench in his first twelve months in office than any 
other President (and four times as many as Barack Obama in his first year).38 Upon 
reaching the historic mark, Faith and Freedom Coalition Executive Director Tim Head 
declared that, due to the President and Senate Republicans’ efforts, the “federal judiciary 
is being reshaped for an entire generation.”39 Especially in light of the following chart,40 
the impact these lifetime appointments will have on the judiciary’s composition should 
not be understated. 
 
                                                 
38 Tessa Berenson, "Donald Trump Set a Record for Confirming Federal Judges," Time, December 15, 
2017, Accessed October 18, 2018, http://time.com/5066679/donald-trump-federal-judges-record/.  
39 Ibid.  
40 Charlie Savage, "Trump Is Rapidly Reshaping the Judiciary. Here's How," The New York Times, 
November 11, 2017, Accessed January 26, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/11/us/politics/trump-
judiciary-appeals-courts-conservatives.html.  
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As of January 19, 2018, the Senate had confirmed 23 of the President’s Article III 
nominees, including Neil Gorsuch, a conservative, textualist, 50 year old former Circuit 
Court of Appeals Judge for the 10th Circuit.41 At the time of his confirmation, Mr. 
Gorsuch was the youngest successful nominee since Clarence Thomas.42 Following 
Senate Democrats’ filibuster of Mr. Gorsuch’s nomination, Sen. McConnell employed 
the so-called “nuclear option” in order to confirm the Justice. This action, which cut the 
votes necessary to confirm the Supreme Court Justice from 60 to a simple majority, was 
the first time the process had been used to push a judge through to the highest federal 
court.43 
Overall, the practice of appointing judges and justices that share the President’s 
political orientation is not a new one: As discussed above, the practice dates from the 
time of Marbury vs. Madison. The extent to which the number of judicial nominees put in 
place by President Trump is troubling depends largely on one’s political orientation. 
What is of note in the context of the present analysis is the degree nominations appear to 
be subject to a political litmus test and without regard to judicial qualification. Four of 
President Trump’s nominees for judicial positions in his first year in office were rated as 
“not qualified” by the American Bar Association.44 One of these, Brett J. Talley, a 
                                                 
41 Kyle Kim, "Trump Appointing Judges at Rapid pace," Los Angeles Times, January 19, 2018, Accessed 
April 20, 2018, http://www.latimes.com/projects/la-na-pol-trump-federal-judiciary/. 
42 Aaron Blake, "The One Big Reason Republicans REALLY Love Neil Gorsuch," The Washington Post, 
February 01, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/02/01/why-neil-gorsuchs-age-
is-a-big-deal-for-republicans-and-the-supreme-court/?utm_term=.f9bb15e294f6. 
43 Ali Rogin, "Senate Approves 'nuclear Option,' Clears Path for Neil Gorsuch Supreme Court Nomination 
Vote," ABC News, April 06, 2017, Accessed November 23, 2018, http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/senate-
approves-nuclear-option-fight-gorsuch-supreme-court/story?id=46608672.  
44 Philip Bump, "Analysis | How Unusual Are Trump's 'not Qualified' Judicial Nominations?", The 
Washington Post, December 15, 2017, Accessed January 19, 2018, 
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nominee for a federal judgeship in Alabama, eventually withdrew his name after it was 
revealed that he had never tried a case, was unanimously rated “not qualified" by the 
American Bar Association's judicial rating committee, had practiced law for only three 
years, and had posted highly partisan posts on the internet.45 Another nominee, Matthew 
Spencer Petersen (who had never tried a jury or civil case), went viral on the internet 
after he struggled to answer basic legal questions posed to him by Republican Senator 
Neely Kennedy (R-LA).46 Charges have been raised by scholars such as Russell Wheeler 
from the Brookings Institution that Trump nominees are more consistently conservative 
due to the extensive vetting responsibility given to the Federalist Society,47 which holds 
strong financial ties to conservative donors such as the Koch Brothers.48   
The fifth factor to be considered in determining the degree of Supreme Court 
politicization relates to the extent of polarization among members of the bench itself. 
According to research conducted by Atlantic writer David Paul Kuhn, less than 2% of 
Supreme Court rulings were decided by single vote margins from 1804-1940.49 In 2012, 
                                                 
45 David Savage, "Embattled Trump Judicial Nominee Brett Talley Withdraws," Los Angeles Times, 
December 13, 2017, Accessed January 19, 2018, http://www.latimes.com/politics/washington/la-na-pol-
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the statistic was 20%.50 Thus there is at least some quantitative evidence that the Supreme 
Court is increasingly polarized.  
Many academics and researchers have attempted to put numbers to the 
phenomenon of increased polarization among the American public. According to the 
“DW-NOMINATE” metric developed by Professors Keith Poole and Howard Rosenthal, 
Congress is more polarized today than any time since reconstruction.51 Nor is Congress 
unrepresentative in this regard. As demonstrated by a 2014 study conducted by the Pew 
Research Center, 52 Americans were more ideologically divided then than in several 
decades. Perhaps even more concerning, in recent years, each party is increasingly 
viewing the other as a “threat to the nation’s well-being.”53 While there is significant 
debate as to whether the ideological divide that characterizes the public today caused the 
polarization of the political parties in Congress—or vice versa—it appears clear that both 
the people and their representatives are moving away from the prospect of compromise.  
It certainly makes sense that as members of Congress and the public have become 
more polarized, the judiciary might follow suit. However, while it is difficult to quantify 
politicization in the legislative arena, it is perhaps even more so in the judicial realm. The 
most well-known standard for assessing judicial ideology is the Martin-Quinn score, 
developed by Professors Andrew Martin and Kevin Quinn. Using their statistical 
algorithm, the two graphed each Supreme Court Justice’s ideological position on a scale 
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51 Drew DeSilver, "The Polarized Congress of Today Has Its Roots in the 1970s," Pew Research Center, 
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of -8 (most liberal) to 8 (most conservative).54 Indeed, as demonstrated by the following 
chart,55 it appears that the “gap” between justices, as well as the standard deviations, has 
grown since roughly the mid-1960s, when substantive due process was revived in 
“personal liberty” cases. 
 
In conclusion, based on the working definition of politicization proposed, it 
appears that today’s Supreme Court is broadly viewed as highly politicized. This paper 
does not argue that the substantive due process is the sole or even necessarily the primary 
cause of our highly politicized and polarized court. It does, however, assert that the 
doctrine is the primary means by which the Court justifies incorrect decisions that are 
constitutionally designed to remain in the legislative arena, thereby courting the kind of 
politicization described above.  
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Section Two: Exploring the Constitutional Merits of Substantive 
Due Process 
 
Initial Remarks 
 This section of the thesis focuses on providing an overview of substantive due 
process or “natural rights” jurisprudence. In doing so, it addresses the following 
questions: 
● What is substantive due process? 
● How is the doctrine’s legitimacy tied to modes of constitutional interpretation? 
● Is the doctrine supported by the Constitution—either by the Fifth or Fourteenth 
Amendment Due Process Clauses or by references to unenumerated rights within 
the Ninth Amendment? 
● Do contemporary sources suggest that some notion of substantive due process 
may reasonably be “read into” the Constitution? 
 
What is Substantive Due Process? 
In examining the legitimacy of substantive due process, it is first necessary to 
develop a working definition of the term. Interestingly, as argued by Professor John 
Harrison at the University of Virginia, “the textual pedigree of substantive due process 
has no definitive judicial articulation-there is no Marbury, no McCulloch, for substantive 
due process.”56 In the absence of an authoritative description, the doctrine is often defined 
in juxtaposition to procedural due process, which is explicitly protected by the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments. Specifically, the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause 
prohibits the federal government from depriving any person of “life, liberty, or property, 
                                                 
56 John Harrison, "Substantive Due Process and The Constitutional Text," Virginia Law Review 83, no. 3 
(April 1997):, 495, Accessed January 14, 2018, doi:10.18411/a-2017-023. 
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without due process of law.”57 The Fourteenth Amendment extends that prohibition to the 
states.  
Director of the William E. and Carol G. Simon Center on Religion and the 
Constitution at the Witherspoon Institute, Professor Matthew Franck, articulates the 
distinction between procedural and substantive due process as follows:  
A procedural right is one that requires the government to enforce its policies—it 
matters not what they are—in such a way and by such processes that we are 
treated fairly under the rules laid down. A substantive right is a right against the 
imposition of certain kinds of policies on us under any circumstances—in this 
instance it mattering a great deal what the policies are, therefore, and there being 
no “right way,” no rules laid down, that can render the policy itself legitimate.58 
 
Thus, procedural due process merely asks whether the government has followed proper 
legal channels before taking a punitive measure. Justice Scalia put his explanation 
simply: 
Now, what does this guarantee? Does it guarantee life, liberty or property? No, 
indeed! All three can be taken away. You can be fined, you can be incarcerated, 
you can even be executed, but not without due process of law. It’s a procedural 
guarantee.59 
 
Indeed, from a grammatical standpoint, the clause’s language is clear. To use an analogy, 
suppose instead that it read, “No employer shall terminate an employee, reduce hours, or 
change insurance plans without first submitting a two week, advance notice to the 
Department of Labor.” This does not mean a department manager at Amazon is 
prohibited from firing the consistently late delivery truck driver, moving shifts around, or 
                                                 
57 U.S. Const. Amend V. 
58 Matthew J. Franck, "What Happened to the Due Process Clause in the Dred Scott Case? The Continuing 
Confusion over “Substance” versus “Process”," American Political Thought 4, no. 1 (Winter 2015), 122, 
Accessed February 13, 2018, doi:10.1086/679325. 
59 Antonin Scalia, "Constitutional Interpretation the Old Fashioned Way," March 14, 2005, Accessed 
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re-evaluating its contract with Blue Cross. Furthermore, such a clause would certainly not 
grant the delivery driver paid paternity leave, 2x overtime pay, or a 401(k) match.  
Nonetheless, this is precisely the kind of interpretation the Supreme Court has 
read into the Constitution through its use of substantive due process. In general, the 
doctrine asks “whether” or “what” instead of “how.” It asks, as Professor Erwin 
Chemerinsky put it in a 1999 speech at Duke University, “whether the government’s 
deprivation of a person’s life, liberty or property is justified by a sufficient purpose… a 
good enough reason for such a deprivation.”60 Since the doctrine is only employed when 
laws are purportedly adverse to notions of “ordered liberty” or “natural rights,” this paper 
uses the terms substantive due process and natural rights jurisprudence interchangeably. 
In undertaking a substantive due process analysis, then, the courts first determine 
whether a right is fundamental and, if it is, requires a compelling, narrowly tailored 
interest to be curtailed.61 By contrast, there only has to be rational basis for legislation to 
infringe upon non-fundamental rights, including, for example, economic rights.62 In this 
manner, courts take on the responsibility of “weighing” the interests of the state and the 
individual whose substantive due process rights are at issue, giving more or less latitude 
to the state, depending on whether the “right” is fundamental. Of course, this kind of 
interest “weighing” is precisely what legislatures do—explicitly or implicitly—when they 
enact public policy. Nonetheless, the doctrine is likely an attractive one to justices 
confronted by laws that, on their face, appear to be unjust or repugnant, since the concept 
                                                 
60 Erwin Chemerinsky, Substantive Due Process, 15 Touro Law Review 1501 (1999), Available at: 
https://schoalrship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/718. The source is an article written by Sydney M. 
Irmas, Professor of Law and Political Science at the University of Southern California Law School based 
on a transcript of Professor Chemerinsky’s speech.  
61 Ibid., 1501-1534. 
62 Ibid., 1501-1534. 
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gives them the authority to find the law inconsistent with fundamental notions of liberty 
and to invalidate it on those grounds.  
However, in the words of Justice Scalia, “the judge who always likes the results 
he reaches is a bad judge.”63 Substantive due process provides judges with wide-ranging 
authority to do what may very well be morally or ethically preferable. But at what 
expense in terms of the Court’s credibility? The words used in both the Due Process 
Clauses are readily understandable: On their faces, they do not suggest or imply anything 
further than the requirement that the government use properly constructed, followed, and 
fair processes before depriving a person of life, liberty, or property. Reading a meaning 
that so substantially expands the power of the judiciary comes at a great cost in terms of 
the court’s legitimacy in the eyes of the public. Before fully expounding the politicizing 
effects natural rights jurisprudence has on the court, however, this paper first examines 
the doctrine’s constitutional legitimacy.  
Substantive Due Process and Constitutional Interpretation 
Because the concept of substantive due process has no support in the literal 
language of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments, but rather finds its foundation in 
natural rights jurisprudence, any discussion of the doctrine must first commence by 
determining whether a textualist, originalist, or “living Constitution” mode of legal 
interpretation is most appropriate. This thesis employs a textualist approach to reading 
the law, reflecting the view that, while imperfect, this is the best means of discovering the 
“true” meaning of a given statute. Under this form of analysis, the judicial branch (and all 
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others, for that matter) should first and foremost prioritize the letter and structure of the 
text when wrangling with its implications. Only when the language itself is vague or 
unclear are other supplemental historical sources permissible in order to discover what 
the law means.  
Why? Because while particular framers’ intents, regional and temporal 
circumstances, or the understanding of the “public” might change, the letter of the law 
remains unless and until it is amended. As such, the words themselves are “dead” rather 
than living—or, as the late Justice Scalia preferred, “enduring.”64 In contrast to various 
modes of originalism, a textualist first and foremost prioritizes the words of the law 
themselves rather than the intent of its ratifiers, the public, or any other body involved in 
the statute’s passage. As such, it is “law that governs, not the intent of the lawgiver.”65 
However, a heightened sense of respect for the language of the text itself need not 
confine judges to overly simplistic, at-times silly interpretations of the law. Take, for 
example, the Free Exercise Clause within the First Amendment, which states: “Congress 
shall make no law… prohibiting the free exercise thereof [religion].”66 If a religious 
organization mandated murder of infidels as a requisite for admission to the church, a 
“strict constructionist” might be compelled to interpret the First Amendment in such a 
manner that disobeys Congress from prohibiting a capital offense. I, along with other 
textualists, would defend no such reading. Rather, the words themselves should neither 
be blanketly interpreted broadly or narrowly, but reasonably.67  
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With respect to substantive due process, Justice Scalia argued at a CSPAN-
televised presentation at the Woodrow Wilson Center that, with the doctrine, “the Court 
has essentially liberated itself from the text of the Constitution, from the text and even 
from the traditions of the American people.”68 Indeed, one need not be an originalist—
one who strictly interprets the constitutional clauses in line with how their adopters 
would have understood them—to refute substantive due process under the Fifth or 
Fourteenth Amendments. Instead, one simply must demand solid textual backing from 
the founding document.  
Nonetheless, natural rights jurisprudence and “living Constitution” theory are 
integrally related, and they are both well regarded by a great many justices and scholars 
in the legal community. Rather than employing historical or textual arguments, 
proponents of a “fluid” or “evolving” Constitution often emphasize three primary 
arguments in its favor in relation to alternatives: 1) It is more practical or prudent given 
our modern political environment, 2) The Constitution itself does not outline a singular, 
proper mode of interpretation, and there is little historical evidence to suggest that the 
Framers expected future generations to employ a strictly originalist framework, and 3) In 
addition to rules and procedures, the Constitution elucidates various underlying 
“principles,” which, similarly to our governing system, were meant to endure over time. 
Each of these is addressed below.  
According to David Strauss, Gerald Ratner Distinguished Service Professor of 
Law at the University of Chicago, given the difficulty of the amendment process, it is 
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unreasonable to expect the Constitution to “keep up” with modern advancements in 
technology, social norms, economic transformation, and international globalization.69 
Indeed, the Framers could hardly have anticipated 21st century issues related to internet 
surveillance and due process, the extraordinary capability of today’s guns and individual 
rights to bear them, as well as a multitude of other constitutional dilemmas born out of 
social evolution and technological innovation.  
For this reason, one of the central arguments in favor of incorporating modern 
society’s views when evaluating the constitutionality of a given law is that doing so 
provides “flexibility.” In this manner, the Constitution remains “workable” in the 21st 
century. When Justices Breyer and Scalia testified during a Senate Judiciary hearing in 
2011, the liberal defender of a living Constitution asserted that the danger of originalism 
“is interpreting those words in a way that they will no longer work for a country of 308 
million Americans who are living in the 21st century—work in the way those framers 
would have wanted them to work had they been able to understand our society."70 By 
employing his framework, Justice Breyer contends the Court maintains legitimacy in the 
eyes of the American public. 
Notably, this argument underemphasizes the mechanisms explicitly included by 
the Founders for ensuring that the Constitution remains sufficiently flexible to 
accommodate changing times: the framework for a limited federal government and the 
amendment process itself. Indeed, while the text of the Constitution might very well be 
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inconvenient for the ultimate settlement of public policy issues, the suggestion that it 
cannot “work for the people of today” is unfounded due to the document’s amendability. 
The original Constitution of 1776 was one of the most democratic of its time, and its 
subsequent amendments (most notably the Seventeenth, Nineteenth, Twenty Fourth, and 
Twenty Sixth) have made it even more so without the help of judicial intervention.  
 And, while it is fair to say that the process for amending the Constitution is 
relatively difficult, it is by no means impossible. Since the ratification of the Bill of 
Rights in 1791, the Constitution has been modified by 17 different times. Thus, since 
then, there has been roughly one amendment passed every 13 years (albeit none since the 
passage of the 27th Amendment in 1992). For this reason, although constitutional 
amendments often come in waves, as they did during Reconstruction and from 1910-
1933, the process is certainly surmountable.  
 Furthermore, negation of substantive due process does not necessarily prohibit a 
more expansive reading of other constitutional provisions. The powers delegated to the 
federal government have grown enormously since the Great Depression and World War 
II. Without the New Deal, Social Security, and other federal programs that were 
previously deemed outside the scope of congressional authority, it is quite likely that the 
country would not have moved forward the way it did. However, while programs may 
have been struck down under a strictly originalist reading of the Constitution, they did 
have solid textual backing under either the Interstate Commerce or Necessary and Proper 
Clauses. As the final section argues, a more open-ended reading of other constitutional 
provisions readily addresses many of the practical issues proponents of substantive due 
process allege.  
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Moreover, rather than enhancing the credibility of the Court, as proponents of the 
“living Constitution” approach argue, judicial distortion of the plain meaning of the text 
as well as far-ranging contemporary interpretation of various fundamental “principles” 
has done enormous damage to the institution's image. Various examples of this 
phenomenon will be examined in the historical analysis. 
Second, proponents of living Constitution theory also rightly point out that the 
Constitution itself does not specify any particular interpretative scheme justices must (or 
should) abide. Indeed, Article III is extremely vague in its articulation of the judicial 
branch: “The Judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one Supreme Court, 
and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.”71 
What precisely is meant by the “judicial power”—as well as its limits—is far from clear. 
For example, the classic debate over judicial supremacy versus departmentalism is one 
instance in which scholars often turn to other sections of the Constitution, as well as 
legislative history, in order to form opinions.  
 Along these lines, the Framers were well aware (or, at the very least, hopeful) that 
the government they were setting the foundations for would last long after they were no 
longer around to explain the founding document’s meaning. In ratifying the Constitution, 
did they truly expect judges to make their attempts at “time traveling” into the minds of 
men who lived centuries earlier? It would seem that Jefferson, as demonstrated in a letter 
to Samuel Kercheval, fully expected—and in fact believed it beneficial—for times and 
institutions to progress alongside society itself: 
I am certainly not an advocate for frequent and untried changes in laws and 
constitutions. I think moderate imperfections had better be borne with; 
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because, when once known, we accommodate ourselves to them, and find 
practical means of correcting their ill effects. But I know also, that laws and 
institutions must go hand in hand with the progress of the human mind. As that 
becomes more developed, more enlightened, as new discoveries are made, new 
truths disclosed, and manners and opinions change with the change of 
circumstances, institutions must advance also, and keep pace with the times. 
We might as well require a man to wear still the coat which fitted him when a 
boy, as civilized society to remain ever under the regimen of their barbarous 
ancestors.72 
 
Supporters of an evolving Constitution often emphasize the final three sentences of this 
passage, which is on Panel 4 of the Jefferson Memorial.73 However, the reference to 
changing “laws and constitutions” would seem to imply that there must be a deliberate, 
systematic process by which these changes take hold. So yes, in addition to Justice John 
Marshall, the Framers were well aware that they were expounding a Constitution to last 
for centuries. However, this does not mean its meaning was somehow malleable without 
a formal amendment process.   
 With respect to the final argument proposed, it is readily admitted that the 
Constitution elucidates various principles in addition to rules and procedures for a new 
system of government. Checks and balances, republicanism, and federalism are all 
institutional principles that are reasonably inferred from the words of the document as 
well as those of the Founders. For more individual or “personal” principles, one need not 
look further than the First Amendment: It is indeed difficult to argue that Congress’s 
prohibition on infringement of the freedom of the press, speech, or peaceful assembly are 
rules in the same sense as “make your bed before school.” Instead, the First Amendment 
                                                 
72 Thomas Jefferson Encyclopedia. "Quotations on the Jefferson Memorial." Thomas Jefferson's 
Monticello, Accessed February 20, 2018. https://www.monticello.org/site/jefferson/quotations-jefferson-
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outlines various broadly articulated individual rights against the federal government that 
require reasonable interpretation to properly understand. Why should the allusion to other 
concepts such as unenumerated rights in the Ninth Amendment, the “ends” articulated in 
the preamble, or others be so different? 
 The answer to this question is that when the Court is given license to adjudicate 
immensely broad concepts such as “liberty,” it begins to look far more like a legislature 
than a tribunal. Nonetheless, under a textualist framework, the remainder of this section 
recognizes the possibility that the Ninth Amendment lends natural rights jurisprudence 
some credibility. However, when viewed in relation to the politicization that the 
understanding causes (fully articulated in the third section), this paper argues that such an 
interpretation affords the Constitution a serious flaw.  
Substantive Due Process and the Bill of Rights 
The notion of “natural rights” has long historical roots within American 
constitutional history. Indeed, the concept was foundational to such early influencers as 
Locke, Voltaire, and Rousseau. These thinkers had extraordinary impacts on several 
Framers, including Thomas Jefferson. Perhaps our early nation’s greatest writer, 
Jefferson made these ideals clear in the Declaration of Independence: 
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they 
are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights, that among these 
are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. That to secure these rights, 
governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the 
consent of the governed.74 
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It might seem odd, then, that our nation’s preeminent legal document would disregard the 
protection of these natural rights in light of the Framers’ high regard for them. Especially 
from this excerpt, it appears clear that our forefathers envisioned a society where 
“liberty” would serve as the foundation of good government. According to Edward Erler, 
senior fellow at the Claremont Institute: 
Madison also wrote that the purpose of the Constitution was grounded in “the 
transcendent law of nature and nature’s God, which declares that the safety and 
happiness of society are the objects at which all political institutions aim and to 
which all such institutions must be sacrificed.” Everyone, of course, recognizes 
this statement as a paraphrase of the Declaration of Independence. Madison 
clearly says here and other places in The Federalist that the principles of the 
Declaration supply the ends or purposes of the Constitution and that 
institutions—structures—are subordinate to the ends. There can be little doubt 
that this was the understanding of the Founding generation.75 
 
Indeed, Federalist No. 51 stated that “justice is the end of government. It is the end of 
civil society. It ever has been and ever will be pursued until it be obtained, or until liberty 
be lost in the pursuit.”76 Thus, Professor Erler may, in fact, be correct in asserting that the 
Framers viewed the Constitution as a means to achieve the ends articulated in the 
Declaration of Independence. Insofar as this end is “justice,” one could contend that the 
courts have a role to play in the defense of so-called natural rights. 
Furthermore, it is true that by 1798—not long after ratification of the 
Constitution—the Supreme Court was considering questions related to natural law that, 
                                                 
75 Edward J. Erler, "Natural Rights and the Limited Government Model of the Constitution: A Response to 
Patrick Garry," Law & Liberty, January 05, 2014, Accessed February 20, 2018, 
http://www.libertylawsite.org/liberty-forum/natural-rights-and-the-limited-government-model-of-the-
constitution-a-response-to-patrick-garry/. 
76 James Madison or Alexander Hamilton, "Federalist No. 5: The Structure of the Government Must 
Furnish the Proper Checks and Balances Between the Different Departments," The Avalon Project : 
Federalist No 51, Accessed April 20, 2018, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/fed51.asp. 
  
 
32 
 
today, would likely be framed in terms of substantive due process. While the decision 
makes no reference to the Fifth Amendment or its Due Process Clause (in fact, the case 
was ultimately decided on the interpretation of Article I’s ex-post facto clause), the 
notion that legislatures simply cannot take certain actions regardless of whether they are 
expressly prohibited by the Constitution was famously expounded in Justice Samuel 
Chase’s Calder v. Bull (1798) decision: 
I cannot subscribe to the omnipotence of a State Legislature, or that it is absolute 
and without control; although its authority should not be expressly restrained 
by the Constitution, or fundamental law, of the State. The people of the United 
States erected their Constitutions, or forms of government, to establish justice, to 
promote the general welfare, to secure the blessings of liberty; and to protect their 
persons and property from violence... The nature, and ends of legislative power 
will limit the exercise of it. There are acts which the Federal, or State, 
Legislature cannot do, without exceeding their authority. There are certain vital 
principles in our free Republican governments, which will determine and over-
rule an apparent and flagrant abuse of legislative power; as to authorize manifest 
injustice by positive law; or to take away that security for personal liberty, or 
private property, for the protection whereof of the government was established. 
An ACT of the Legislature (for I cannot call it a law) contrary to the great 
first principles of the social compact, cannot be considered a rightful exercise 
of legislative authority.77 
 
Although he concurred in the decision, Justice James Iredell vehemently rebutted the 
view articulated by his colleague:  
The ideas of natural justice are regulated by no fixed standard: the ablest and the 
purest men have differed upon the subject; and all that the Court could properly 
say, in such an event, would be, that the Legislature (possessed of an equal right 
of opinion) had passed an act which, in the opinion of the judges, was inconsistent 
with the abstract principles of natural justice.78 
 
While the doctrine may not have had the same, formal title it does today, it is clear that 
the fundamental question whether the federal judiciary should be the bulwarks of 
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natural—as well as man-made—law is reflected in the earliest days of the Court’s history. 
It is equally clear that, even so shortly after ratification of the Constitution, there was no 
consensus among jurists that the Bill of Rights provided protection for rights not 
specifically enumerated in the Constitution. 
Substantive Due Process under the Fifth Amendment 
 It should be emphasized up front that the meaning of “substantive” due process 
has changed over time. Furthermore, what is regarded as a procedural question to a 
particular scholar may very well be deemed more substantive in nature to another, 
depending on how strictly one interprets “process.” Sharswood Fellow and Professor of 
Law at the University of Pennsylvania Ryan Williams contends that the phrase “due 
process” originated out of developments in the English Magna Carta in 1215.79 
Originally, the text read that no freeman would be deprived of rights except, “by the 
judgement of his peers and by the law of the land.”80 Later, “law of the land” was 
superseded by “due process of law.”81 At this stage, Lord Edward Coke, who would later 
become Chief Justice of England and Wales, regarded the two phrases to be synonymous 
and wrote that: “the power and jurisdiction of the parliament, for making of laws” was 
“so transcendent and absolute” as to be boundless.”82 As we will see, various 
contemporary scholars have argued that the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments have very different meanings today (and from each other).  
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Regardless of its historical origins, it is indisputable that the plain language of the 
Fifth (or Fourteenth) Amendment does not vest the Due Process Clauses with substantive 
meaning. Furthermore, there is no solid body of evidence suggesting that the Fifth 
Amendment was intended to impose substantive, in addition to a procedural, limitations 
on the Federal Government’s exercise of power. In its entirety, the Amendment states: 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, 
unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in 
the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or 
public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put 
in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a 
witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without 
just compensation.83 
 
The majority of the text outlines various rules and procedures for indictment. As such, it 
is entirely sensible for the Amendment to conclude with a prohibition against punishment 
without “due process” of law. In this manner, the Fifth Amendment encapsulates the 
protection of other processes that the Congress or, perhaps, the judiciary, may deem 
necessary to protect. Indeed, at the time of the framing, the Constitution was not seen as 
having judiciable limitations with respect to “due process of law.”84 This was also the 
stance taken by influencers such as William Blackstone, Justice Joseph, Story, and 
Chancellor James Kent.85 
 Others, such as Timothy Sandefur, Lincoln Fellow at the Claremont Institute, read 
the Fifth Amendment differently. According to him, the word “law” implies something 
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more than merely a provision or policy properly passed in accordance with relevant 
procedures. Instead, the word itself has a substantive element: “Law is the use of 
government power in the service of a rational, general, public principle.”86 As such, 
arbitrary, malicious, or otherwise irrational public policies, regardless of how dutifully 
they followed the proper procedures for passage, are not truly “law” (as we will see, this 
is what Justice Taney meant in his Dred Scott decision).  
 This argument is not particularly compelling because virtually every court and 
legislature throughout American history has recognized the existence of bad, unjust, or 
poorly executed laws. Indeed, an even greater majority of the public would recognize this 
to be the case, as well. Furthermore, as noted by Professor Rosenthal at Chapman 
University, the Constitution itself recognizes in Article I that if a bill is passed by both 
Houses of Congress and signed by the Chief Executive (or if the President’s veto is 
overridden by the Senate), “it shall become Law” regardless of its nature. 87 Thus, while 
perhaps the high-browed perspective of a minority of legal scholars, for all intents and 
purposes, a bill becomes a law once it meets the procedural requirements to do so. In 
other words, its substance is irrelevant. As one might suspect, this was the case in 1791 as 
it is today. For this reason, unless one is willing to indulge in extraordinary linguistic 
manipulation, the Fifth Amendment provides neither a textual nor historical basis for 
substantive due process.  
Natural Rights under the Ninth and Tenth Amendments 
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While many scholars disagree about the proper interpretation of the Ninth (and, to 
a lesser extent, Tenth) Amendment, its history is relatively clear. In response to concerns 
about the enlarging scope of federal power under the new Constitution, Anti-Federalists 
sought to enshrine within it a formal Bill of Rights.88 One of the nation’s most resolute 
patriots and vehement opponents of the federal constitution, Patrick Henry, believed that 
in addition to grossly expanding the scope of the federal government, the Constitution did 
not protect fundamental liberties: 
Will the abandonment of your most sacred rights tend the security of your liberty? 
Liberty, the greatest of all earthly blessings—give us that precious jewel and you 
may take everything else. But I fear I have lived long enough to become an old-
fashioned fellow. Perhaps an invincible attachment to the dearest rights of man 
may, in these refined, enlightened days, be deemed old-fashioned: if so, I am 
contented to be so.89 
 
Henry’s deep concern for the liberties that he feared the Constitution might 
disenfranchise stems from a valid historical argument: "that all nations have adopted this 
construction-that all rights not expressly and unequivocally reserved to the people are 
impliedly and incidentally relinquished to rulers, as necessarily inseparable from the 
delegated powers."90 By failing to include a Bill of Rights (as well as an amendment 
explaining that their description was not meant to be exhaustive), Anti-Federalists feared 
the consequences of the new framing document. 
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Meanwhile, Federalists viewed the Constitution from a very different perspective. 
As they saw it, the narrowly tailored document was necessary in order for the federal 
government to accomplish specific goals. Thus, in contrast to the Anti-Federalists 
understanding of state constitutions that "invested their representatives with every right 
and authority which they [the people] did not in explicit terms reserve,"91 the framing of 
the federal government implied precisely the opposite. It would mean, as James Wilson 
put it, that “everything that is not given, is reserved.”As such, a Bill of Rights was either 
redundant or superfluous.92  
Federalists further argued the enumeration of various rights might be used to 
expand the scope of federal power by implication in the future. For example, Alexander 
Hamilton famously remarked that the amendments were “not only unnecessary in the 
proposed constitution, but would even be dangerous.”93 At the 1788 Virginia Convention, 
James Madison articulated that by “enumerating particular exceptions to the grant of 
power… it might follow by implication, that those rights which were not singled out, 
were intended to be assigned into the hands of the General Government.”94 As such, the 
Ninth Amendment was intended to protect the “great residium of rights” not delegated to 
that newly formed government. In a similar fashion, the Tenth Amendment reinforces the 
notion that the great residium of powers shall be left to the states. 
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It is due in large part to the Ninth and Tenth Amendments’ historical context that 
many scholars regard their inclusion to the Bill of Rights as largely symbolic, rather than 
substantive. As put by Professor McAffee, a leading scholar on the subject, the Ninth 
Amendment “is the unique product of the struggle to ratify the Constitution and, more 
specifically, the ratification-period debate over the omission of a bill of rights from the 
Constitution drafted by the Philadelphia convention.”95 Indeed, if its addition merely 
served to ensure that the federal government would not go off-the-walls in doing things 
not explicitly prohibited (but also not expressly granted by Article I), originalists can 
make a strong argument that “natural rights” had little relevance to its passage at all. 
Rather, the final two amendments exclusively sought to maintain a firm system of 
federalism in response to the monarchical form of rule from which the new nation 
recently achieved autonomy. The “old orthodoxy,” as put by McAffee, concerning the 
Ninth Amendment, then, is the proper reading: “The unenumerated rights... are the rights 
of the people reserved by the device of listing granted powers.”96 In other words, the 
Ninth Amendment serves a two-fold purpose: 1) To ensure that the federal government 
does not imply that the enumeration of various rights may be used to extend its own 
authority passed the powers granted by Article I, and 2) To protect the legitimate addition 
of those rights that future generations may feel were not protected by the original 
constitutional text.  
As noted previously, however, the Ninth Amendment provides more ample 
textual evidence for the assertion that, as part of the “judicial power,” the federal courts 
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must protect natural rights (or, at the very least, various unenumerated rights) in addition 
to those that are explicitly spelled out. The text states:   
The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to 
deny or disparage others retained by the people.97 
 
As mentioned, many scholars contend that this is largely an instruction regarding how the 
new federal government should be understood: as one with exclusively enumerated and 
limited powers. However, as the following historical analysis section will show, several 
liberal justices have interpreted a robust, substantive meaning to the Ninth Amendment, 
including Justice Arthur Goldberg in his concurring Griswold v. Connecticut (1965) 
opinion: 
the Ninth Amendment, in indicating that not all such liberties are specifically 
mentioned in the first eight amendments, is surely relevant in showing the 
existence of other fundamental personal rights, now protected from state, as 
well as federal, infringement.98  
 
Absent this interpretation, the Ninth Amendment indeed serves largely a repetitive, 
affirmatory purpose. This is especially true in light of the following Tenth Amendment, 
which states: “The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor 
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”99 
 Indeed, the most solid grounds for those who support judicial protection of 
alleged natural rights such as those of property, liberty of contract, privacy, dignity, or 
otherwise is within an amendment that never mentions the phrase “due process.” The 
most compelling textual foundation, in fact, is to be found within the Ninth Amendment. 
The argument is clear and simple: 1) The Constitution affirms not only the existence, but 
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the peoples’ retention of unenumerated rights 2) Insofar as these rights exist, regardless 
of how difficult it may be to discern precisely what they are, the courts have a 
responsibility to protect them against legislative or executive encroachments. Based 
exclusively on the grammar and structure of the Ninth Amendment, this is, in fact, a solid 
textualist argument. 
 A slightly different but nonetheless related argument is put forth by Randy 
Barnett, a self-proclaimed originalist and Professor of Law at Georgetown University. In 
his article published in the Texas Law Review titled “The Ninth Amendment: It Means 
What It Says,” Barnett employs historical sources to assert that “the purpose of the Ninth 
Amendment was to ensure the equal protection of unenumerated individual natural rights 
on a par with those individual natural rights that came to be listed ‘for greater caution’ in 
the Bill of Rights.”100 Indeed, the Framers’ writings are filled with allusions to 
government’s solemn duty to protect inalienable rights. As such, depending on how 
directly sources are connected, there is an abundance of evidence to draw from to support 
the assertion that natural rights were intended to be protected under the Ninth 
Amendment. This is, of course, readily contested by various scholars, including 
McAffee:  
Indeed, in the midst of the ratification-era debate over the advantages and 
disadvantages of express and implied reservations and enumerated powers and 
enumerated rights, there was virtually no discussion of the force of natural rights 
standing alone. This is, no doubt, because the crux of the debate was how best to 
secure these rights in positive law… Indeed, the ratification materials seem to 
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cut against the view that at the time of the founding there was a clear 
consensus in favor of the concept of enforceable unwritten limitations.101 
 
Of course, the language has also been read other ways. Rather than placing the 
emphasis on the possibility of other rights retained by the people, one can prioritize the 
phraseology concerning “deny and disaparge.” According to Justice Scalia, the Ninth 
Amendment’s prohibition on denying or disparaging other rights “is far removed from 
affirming any one of them, and even further removed from authorizing judges to identify 
what they might be, and to enforce the judges’ list against laws duly enacted by the 
people.”102 This argument, however, is unconvincing. Insofar as justices refuse to accept 
or protect a “right”—natural or municipal—they are, in fact, denying it.  
 Another understanding put forth by Robert Bork during his Senate confirmation 
hearings was that the Ninth Amendment served to ensure that the enumeration of federal 
rights would not be used to disparage those protected by states under their respective 
constitutions.103 To be sure, this would parlay well into the Ninth Amendment’s history. 
In response to rising federal authority, states would want to ensure that their ability to 
protect additional rights would be protected.  
Given the plethora of divided theories, it is difficult to discern a single, clearly 
defined “meaning” of the Ninth Amendment. At the very least, then, from both a 
textualist and originalist standpoint, the waters are rather murky. Furthermore, they are 
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increasingly so depending on which sources are prioritized as well as what mode of 
originalism (framers intent, public understanding, etc.) is employed.  
And, while the constitutional merits of natural rights jurisprudence are hazy, 
deciphering what, precisely is protected under such a doctrine is even more so. Perhaps 
the most illustrative metaphor for this difficulty was exemplified by Judge Robert Bork 
during his Senate confirmation hearings. In response to questions from Senator Dennis 
DeConcini (D-Ariz.), Bork stated: 
I do not think you can use the Ninth Amendment unless you know something of 
what it means. For example, if you had an amendment that says “Congress shall 
make no” and then there is an ink blot and you cannot read the rest of it and that is 
the only copy you have, I do not think the court can make up what might be under 
the ink blot if you cannot read it.104 
 
And, while Judge Bork was referring to the Ninth Amendment as somewhat of an “ink 
blot” rather than the notion of natural rights itself, the point holds true nonetheless. What, 
exactly, is natural right? As the following section will argue, the Court’s use of natural 
rights jurisprudence to overturn acts of various legislatures has undermined the 
institution’s legitimacy and politicized it immensely. First, however, it is necessary to 
examine whether substantive due process is supported by the Fourteenth Amendment.  
Substantive Due Process under the Fourteenth Amendment 
The language of the Due Process Clause in the Fourteenth Amendment is nearly 
identical to that in the Fifth: “...Nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law.”105 Thus, the textualist argument put forth in the 
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previous chapter remains relevant. On its face, the Amendment does not imply that there 
are liberties—“fundamental” or otherwise—that the state simply cannot take away.  
 However, several scholars have argued that under an originalist interpretative 
framework, the Due Process Clause within the Reconstruction Amendment does, in fact, 
have a more substantive component. Indeed, since the concept of natural rights and due 
process continued to evolve in the decades following the Bull decision, it is necessary to 
analyze whether, by the time of the Fourteenth Amendment, the meaning of the clause 
had so evolved as to support today’s substantive due process jurisprudence. Throughout 
the 1800s courts and lawyers began to accept more novel interpretations of the clause in 
order to incorporate a theory of natural rights into the Constitution.106 According to an 
article published by Williams in the Yale Law Journal, by 1868 a “recognizable form of 
substantive due process had been embraced by courts in 20 of the 37 then-existing states 
as well as by the United States Supreme Court.”107  
 However, the kind of “substantive” due process Williams argues pre-dates the 
Fourteenth Amendment is very different from the “fundamental” liberty jurisprudence 
that has become widely accepted in the 21st century. He argues that the pre-civil war due 
process cases appear to come in two primary forms: “vested rights” and “general law” 
due process. The former suggests that there are certain “vested rights” that cannot be 
retroactively impacted by legislation. As Alexander Hamilton put it: “The proposition, 
that a power to do, includes virtually, a power to undo, as applied to a legislative body, is 
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generally but not universally true. All vested rights form an exception to the rule.”108 
Thus, in addition to obviously ex-post facto laws, those that specifically target vested 
rights are purportedly illegitimate, as well. As put by E.S. Corwin in “The Dred Scott 
Decision, in the Light of Contemporary Legal Doctrines:”   
The doctrine of "vested rights" signified this: that property rights were sacred by 
the law of nature and the social compact, that any legislative enactment affecting 
such rights was always to be judged of from the point of view of their operation 
upon such rights, and that when an enactment affected such rights detrimentally 
without making compensation to the owner, it was to be viewed as inflicting upon 
such owner a penalty ex post facto and therefore as void.109 
 
This understanding will have particularly profound consequences in the Dred Scott case. 
And, interestingly, it was not Justice Taney’s understanding of the vested rights doctrine 
that was viewed as problematic at the time, but his proclamation that black persons could 
not be regarded as citizens. 
Williams argues that the second “General Law” strand of due process 
jurisprudence developed in the 19th century assumed that all citizens live under “general” 
and “impartial” laws.110 Therefore, designated individuals or classes cannot be relegated 
to hierarchical classes or provided special privileges. This is, according to Williams, what 
Daniel Webster was referring to in his famous Trustees of Dartmouth College v. 
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Woodward (1819) speech.111 In this way, the “general law” cases appear to reflect the 
principles enunciated in the Equal Protection Clause.  
  Thus, an understanding of vested rights that strictly prohibits ex-post facto laws as 
well as the general law philosophy hardly reflect the same substantive due process 
doctrine adopted in the Lochner line of cases or in those articulating a constitutional right 
to privacy, dignity, etc. In fact, these strands (at least as described here) of due process 
arguably could be better characterized as procedural in nature. The proposition that an 
individual may not be deprived of life, liberty, or property by a subsequent act of the 
legislature could be formulated in traditional due process terms. Professor Harrison 
formulates the argument as follows:   
Suppose we assume, for separation of powers reasons, that only judicial power 
may affect a direct deprivation of life, liberty, or property. Assume further that 
each branch must use the procedures appropriate to it, a conclusion I say results 
from a natural reading of the Due Process Clauses. It would follow that all direct 
deprivations must be effected through judicial procedures, and hence through the 
application of pre-existing law.112 
 
However, as I will argue, the kind of “vested rights” doctrine that Justice Taney employs 
takes on a much more “substantive” form.  
Furthermore, the notion that citizens must be regulated by “impartial” laws, too, is 
sharply distinguishable from what we know as substantive due process jurisprudence 
today. Rather, it would appear that this line of cases reflects some notion that individuals 
in like circumstances should be treated similarly (equal protection) and that if those 
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similarly situated are treated differently, there is some deficiency in process (procedural 
due process). 
  Thus, neither the plain language of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment Due 
Process Clauses nor an examination of what was meant by “due process” at the time 
these amendments were enacted would appear to support today’s substantive due process 
jurisprudence. But is that the end of the discussion or is it necessary to go further—to 
treat the Constitution as a living document whose meaning legitimately extends beyond 
its plain language and the authors’ intent? 
Section Summation 
 As argued throughout this section, on their faces, the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments do not support the assertion that the judiciary is given constitutional license 
to adjudicate on the grounds of natural rights. The Ninth Amendment, however, affords 
both textualists and various sects of originalism a reasonable path towards its 
understanding. Regardless of whether one finds natural rights jurisprudence 
constitutionally legitimate, however, its politicizing effects on the federal judiciary 
generally (as well as the Supreme Court specifically) are more clear and profound. The 
following section is devoted to a historical review of this phenomenon, as well as how the 
doctrine of substantive due process has evolved over the course of the American 
judiciary.  
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Section Three: The Politicizing Role of Substantive Due Process in 
American Jurisprudence 
 
Dred Scott v. Sandford (1957): The Original Substantive Due Process Case? 
Today, substantive due process is hailed by liberals as an essential judicial check 
on governmental infringements of the American peoples’ intrinsic human rights. From 
abortion to sexual sodomy to a plethora of other “private” acts, courts have repeatedly 
used the doctrine over the past six decades to stifle governmental intrusion into the lives 
of its citizens. These decisions, explicitly or implicitly, often rest on judicial 
identification and interpretation of natural or unenumerated rights.  
With that being said, one of the (if not the) most infamous and universally 
denounced Supreme Court decisions rested, at least in part, on the Court’s understanding 
of the substantive (property) rights ostensibly protected by the Fifth Amendment’s Due 
Process Clause—an understanding with implications for basic human rights that would 
be an anathema to today’s proponents of substantive due process. Indeed, according to 
Evan Bernick, former Assistant Director of the Center for Judicial Engagement at the 
Institute for Justice, “perhaps nothing has damaged the reputation of the doctrine more 
than [its] association with Dred Scott v. Sandford.”113 For this reason, the decision holds 
particular relevance for this thesis.  
However, Dred Scott was almost as complex with respect to due process as it was 
legally unsound. To some, the decision rested on the Court’s understanding of natural 
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rights—to others, it relied on some notion of “vested” property rights, and still to others, 
on a commitment to “resolve” the issue of slavery in the Territories, once and for all, 
without regard to established jurisprudence. As such, scholars of equally impressive 
pedigree have disagreed vehemently over how, exactly, the Court understood the Fifth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause. 
And, while the conceptual underpinnings of the Court’s decision are up for 
debate, its history as well as direct implications for Dred Scott are not. Dred Scott and his 
family had been taken by their owners through both slave and free states as well as the 
Territories during the course of a number of years’ sojourn.114 After two unsuccessful 
attempts to gain his freedom through state court actions, Scott sued in the federal court 
system in Missouri.115 At the time the action was filed, Dred Scott and his family resided 
in Missouri, while his purported “owner” resided outside the state.116  
As a direct consequence of the Supreme Court’s ruling, Dred Scott was to remain 
a slave. Furthermore, the Court declared that blacks could not be—nor, as an entire race, 
were they ever intended to be—citizens of the United States with right to sue in federal 
court.117 Lastly, the Court went on in dicta to state that despite the proclamation in 
Section II, Clause II of Article IV that “The Congress shall have power to dispose of and 
make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property 
belonging to the United States,”118 the federal government had no legitimate 
constitutional authority to regulate slavery in the Territories, thereby voiding the Missouri 
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Compromise. From both a moral and legal perspective, the Dred Scott ruling has been 
resolutely denounced across the board.  
Both on the issue of standing and on the legality of the Missouri Compromise, 
Chief Justice Taney, who authored the (7-2) majority decision, had to engage in an 
extraordinarily convoluted exercise in judicial gymnastics. In declaring that Dred Scott 
lacked standing to bring his case for freedom in the federal court system, the Supreme 
Court both explicitly and implicitly leaped over several remarkable hurdles. Specifically, 
Chief Justice Taney: 
● Ignored the failure of the Defendant to raise an objection to Dred Scott’s standing 
in the lower courts; 
● Created a novel distinction between state and US citizenship; 
● Established an “exception” for blacks who could vote in five of the thirteen states 
and who were considered citizens of both the nation and their respective states 
when the Constitution was ratified 
● Distinguished prior Congressional grants of freedom to blacks residing in other 
US territories.119 
 
Perhaps the most notorious aspect of Chief Justice Taney’s ruling, of course, is his 
proclamation that the principles enunciated in the Declaration of Independence were 
never meant to apply to the black race:  
[Negroes were] beings of an inferior order, and altogether unfit to associate with 
the white race, either in social or political relations; and so far inferior, that they 
had no rights which the white man was bound to respect.120  
 
To allow slavery in a society where all men are deemed to be created equal would mean 
that the Framers themselves were hypocrites. It would imply that our forefathers were 
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“utterly and flagrantly inconsistent with the principles they asserted.”121 The only way the 
Framers could have accepted the notion of slavery while simultaneously and without 
hypocrisy hold that conviction that all men are created equal would be to categorically 
exclude slaves from the citizenry. And being excluded from the citizenry, slaves—and 
their descendants—were necessarily precluded from access to the federal court system. 
Interestingly, then, despite abundant evidence to the contrary, Chief Justice Taney could 
have ended the case simply by concluding that the descendants of black slaves could not 
be American citizens. 
However, the Court’s decision went much further in scope and legal 
interpretation. At least in part, it did so in the name of the Fifth Amendment’s Due 
Process Clause. As society’s conception of what constitutes an inalienable privilege 
evolves with the times, hindsight affords us an all-too-clear mirror for us to examine of 
our errors. This is perhaps most evident from Justice Taney’s Dred Scott v. Sandford 
(1957) decision: 
Thus, the rights of property are united with the rights of person, and placed 
on the same ground by the fifth amendment to the Constitution, which provides 
that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, and property, without due process 
of law…. [A]n Act of Congress which deprives a citizen of the United States of 
his liberty or property, merely because he came himself or brought his 
property into a particular Territory of the United States, and who had 
committed no offense against the laws, could hardly be dignified with the 
name of due process of law…. And if the Constitution recognizes the right of 
property of the master in a slave, and makes no distinction between that 
description of property and other property owned by a citizen, no tribunal, 
acting under the authority of the United States, whether it be legislative, 
executive, or judicial, has a right to draw such a distinction, or deny to it the 
benefit of the provisions and guarantees which have been provided for the 
protection of private property against the encroachments of the Government.122 
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It is primarily this language that is cited by those who tie the notion of substantive due 
process to the Dred Scott case. According to scholars such as Robert Bork and the late 
David P. Currie, the decision “was at least very possibly the first application of 
substantive due process in the Supreme Court, the original precedent for Lochner v. New 
York and Roe v. Wade.”123 Indeed, while the passage above explicitly referred to the Fifth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause, it is abundantly clear that the type of due process was 
not “procedural.” Indeed, the means by which the Missouri Compromise (or any other 
federal act) was passed was irrelevant. For this reason, the ruling clearly enunciated a 
substantive component to the Due Process Clause. 
 Whether or not the Dred Scott case was truly a substantive due process decision 
as that term is understood in modern jurisprudence, however, is not so simple a question. 
Certainly the Court did not go beyond the language of the Constitution in the same way 
necessary to find a constitutional right to “privacy.” Nor did the decision suggest or 
imply that the right to hold property—in the form of slaves—was so inherent or 
fundamental that it could never be curtailed by governmental action: After all, the 
Northern states did not authorize or condone slavery.  
How, exactly, the substantive nature of Justice Taney’s reading should be (or was) 
understood at the time the decision was issued may very well differ from today’s notion 
of the doctrine. With that being said, one could be forgiven for reading Justice Taney’s 
decision as stating: 1) The Constitution grants white men a right (a substantive right) to 
property; 2) the Constitution makes no distinction between the ownership of slaves and 
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other forms of property; 3) Congress is legally precluded from depriving white men of 
their slave property in the Territories. However, if this were truly the case, and the right 
to own slaves were both natural and absolute, it would seem to imply that no government 
body would have the authority to ban slavery anywhere. While it might be possible to 
logically draw such a conclusion from various excerpts of the decision, this most 
certainly is not how the outcome was understood.  
 Thus, while it might be more compelling for my overall thesis, the argument is 
not so black and white. Rather than resting on a pure notion of “natural” rights, it may be 
that the conceptual underpinning of the decision related to a particular notion of property 
rights that was well established when the case was decided. As argued by Edward S. 
Corwin in “The Dred Scott Decision, in the light of Contemporary Legal Doctrines”: 
What Taney was attempting to do...was to engraft the doctrine of "vested rights " 
upon the national constitution as a limitation upon national power by casting 
round it the "due process of law" clause of the Fifth Amendment. But neither the 
doctrine of "vested rights" nor yet such use of "due process of law" was novel, 
and indeed, in 1857, the former was comparatively ancient. The doctrine of 
“vested rights” signified this: That property rights were sacred by the law of 
nature….124 
 
Thus, those who give weight to the widely spread recognition of “vested rights” must 
also note that, in a sense, it had a natural rights foundation. To others, though, Chief 
Justice Taney’s argument was less “natural” and simply implied that “when slaveholders 
moved their property from slave jurisdictions to free territories, they could not lose their 
rights in their slaves; otherwise the federal government would have destroyed their vested 
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property rights (and given them to the slave), thus taking from A and giving to B.”125 In 
this manner, Professors Balkin and Levinson view the doctrine used in Dred Scott very 
differently than how it is applied today. 
 Meanwhile, other commentators such as Bernick agree that Dred Scott was, in 
fact, a substantive due process case—albeit one that was wrongly decided—and, in 
support of this view, cites Justice Benjamin R. Curtis’ dissenting opinion. According to 
Bernick, Justice Curtis—like the majority—accepted the notion of natural rights, but 
rather associated them with blacks’ right to freedom rather than the whites’ right to 
property. Specifically, Curtis stated: “Slavery, being contrary to natural right, is created 
only by municipal law.”126 Unfortunately for Bernick, while Justice Curtis did indeed 
dissent from the majority, his assertion that “slavery is contrary to natural right” was not 
meant to imply that it was always illegal. Indeed, he explicitly stated that the institution 
may be created by positive law. This understanding was also pronounced by Justice 
McLean: 
What gives the master the right to control the will of his slave? The local law, 
which exists in some form. But where there is no such law, can the master 
control the will of the slave by force… By virtue of what law is it, that a master 
may take his slave into free territory, and exact him the duties of a slave? The law 
of the Territory does not sanction it. No authority can be claimed under the 
Constitution of the United States, or any law of Congress. Will it be said that the 
slave is taken as property, the same as other property which the master may own? 
To this I answer, that colored persons are made property by the law of the 
State, and no such power has been given to Congress…127 
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Meanwhile, the doctrine of substantive due process means precisely that positive, duly 
passed public policy may be overridden by the court system in the name of natural or 
unenumerated rights. Thus, to suggest that since the dissenting justices believed slavery 
was contrary to natural right implied that it could be prohibited over positive law is 
unfounded.  
In short, legal scholars can be found on both sides of the debate about whether or 
not Dred Scott was a substantive due process case in the vested rights tradition, whether it 
rested on some natural rights concept, or whether it was virtually devoid of the doctrine 
entirely. Often, those opposing the concept of substantive due process attempt to 
associate the case more closely with the philosophy, and those in favor of its broader, 
modern application deny its connection.  
The discussion is not helped by the fact that the complex structure and 
meandering style employed by Chief Justice Taney complicates the job of following the 
case entirely. Insofar as Taney appears to be committed to providing a determinative 
“answer” to the question of slavery in the Territories, his decision indeed has something 
of a “kitchen sink” quality: Any rationale, ideology, historical distortion, or intellectual 
somersault that could be used (including, but not limited to, references to the Fifth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause) was fair game so long as it supported the Justice’s 
pre-ordained conclusion.  
Under these circumstances, it is fair to say that some notion of what we might 
today call a “substantive” right to property appears to be one of several factors in the 
decision. While Chief Justice Taney only referred to the Due Process Clause once (and in 
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passing), the basic concept underlying today’s substantive due process concept was 
articulated elsewhere in the decision: 
The powers of the Government, and the rights of the citizen under it, are positive 
and practical regulations plainly written down. The people of the United States 
have delegated to it certain enumerated powers, and forbidden it to exercise 
others. It has no power over the person or property of a citizen but what the 
citizens of the United States have granted. And no laws or usages of other 
nations, or reasoning of statesmen or jurists upon the relations of master and 
slave, can enlarge the powers of the Government, or take from the citizens the 
rights they have reserved.128  
Indeed, the reference to the Constitution as one that delegated strictly enumerated powers 
evokes an understanding of the Ninth and Tenth Amendments outlined in the previous 
section. However, an equally strong case can be made that, ironically enough, the 
conceptual underpinning of Dred Scott (to the extent one finds one) was a substantive 
notion of “equal protection” of various forms of property. The Court stated: 
Now, as we have already said in an earlier part of this opinion, upon a different 
point, the right of property in a slave is distinctly and expressly affirmed in the 
Constitution. The right to traffic in it, like an ordinary article of merchandise and 
property, was guaranteed to the citizens of the United States, in every State that 
might desire it, for twenty years. . . And no word can be found in the 
Constitution which gives Congress a greater power over slave property, or 
which entitles property of that kind to less protection that property of any 
other description. The only power conferred is the power coupled with the duty 
of guarding and protecting the owner in his rights.129 
 
The dissent of Justice Curtis likewise characterized the majority’s decision as one that 
rested on some notion of “equal protection” of different forms of property. He described 
the majority decision as one that:  
[i]s said to rest upon the equal right of all citizens to go with their property upon 
the public domain, and the inequality of a regulation which would admit the 
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property of some and exclude the property of other citizens; and, inasmuch as 
slaves are chiefly held by citizens of those particular States where slavery is 
established, it is insisted that a regulation excluding slavery from a Territory 
operates, practically, to make an unjust discrimination between citizens of 
different States, in respect to their use and enjoyment of the territory of the 
United States130 
 
This “general law” understanding of substantive due process was thus applied to property 
rather than the individual rights of people to be treated equally before the law. In this 
manner, the Court blithely ignored the rather obvious fact that the respective states 
could—and were always intended to have—diverse public policies related to various 
forms of property, including slavery. Indeed, if Chief Justice Taney’s logic were applied 
today, those who obtained marijuana in states where its recreational possession and use 
was legal could carry it into states where it is strictly prohibited. Of course, such an 
interpretation cannot be reasonably inferred from the text of the Fifth Amendment (or the 
Fourteenth, for that matter). 
Regardless, it appears that rather than purely asserting a property right of the 
individual against the power of the federal government, the Taney Court relied on a 
modified version of “vested” or “general law” substantive due process that had already 
been acknowledged as legitimate by the legal community. Of course, its acceptance does 
not necessarily make it permissible or totally void from a connection to natural law 
jurisprudence. Furthermore, while Taney did not directly go so far as to propose an 
absolute right to slave ownership, his understanding of “vested rights,” some conception 
of arbitrariness, and the Fifth Amendment is nonetheless a preeminent (and particularly 
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glaring) example of how justices may manipulate or ignore evidence more easily with the 
substantive due process doctrine.  
It is clear that when discussing due process, Chief Justice Taney’s decision did 
not refer to the manner by which the Missouri Compromise denied slaveholders of their 
property rights. For this reason, those who claim that the opinion had no substantive due 
process component are on unsteady footing. Furthermore, it’s difficult to reconcile 
whether his understanding of substantive due process was exclusively in the “vested 
rights” tradition in light of his assertion that the “rights of property are united with the 
rights of person.” Indeed, it seems that the Court ruled against Scott because there was 
some unconscionable notion of arbitrariness in a certain property right being taken away 
based on one’s location. In this manner, Chief Justice Taney blended traditional 
conceptions of “vested” property rights with a more modern notion—that the Court has 
the authority to substitute its judgment for that of Congress with regard to what 
deprivations of property are justified.   
The Dred Scott Case and the Politicization of the Supreme Court 
Impassioned political leaders, newspapers, and members of the general public in 
both the North and the South reacted to the Dred Scott decision with unrelenting fervor. It 
is clear from a variety of sources that the outcome of the case itself was (at least in the 
North) regarded not only as poor legal interpretation, but as judicial activism. As such, in 
addition to providing modern scholars a focus point for spirited debate over the history 
and evolution of substantive due process, the case also represents one of the most highly 
political decisions in American constitutional history. 
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As previously outlined, the working definition for this thesis assesses the degree 
of politicization of the Supreme Court using five interrelated factors: 
● The degree to which the Court makes controversial decisions that are important to 
the public and inconsistent with the strongly held views of a not insubstantial 
sector of the public, based on a rationale that is obscure. 
● The extent to which the Supreme Court deviates (or appears to deviate) from 
established precedent or modes of judicial interpretation to reach a particular 
result in cases that have broad political implications.     
● The extent to which Supreme Court composition is the focus of political 
processes, including election rhetoric and voting priorities.  
● The extent to which Supreme Court nomination and confirmation is subject to a 
political litmus test, especially at the expense of judicial qualifications and 
expertise.  
● The degree to which Supreme Court justices are polarized along the legal 
spectrum.   
 
By these criteria, the Dred Scott case was among the most political—and among the most 
politicizing—decisions ever rendered by the Supreme Court.  
 With respect to the first two criteria, it is abundantly clear from the dissents filed 
by Justices Curtis and McLean that the decision deviated from precedent in several ways. 
As already mentioned, while the “vested rights” doctrine had been applied previously, its 
use here was groundbreaking in its scope. Additionally, the conclusion itself that 
Congress could not regulate slavery in the Territories was, of course, extraordinary. The 
notion had not been seriously contested from a legal standpoint since the Missouri 
Compromise, and, given that the Constitution explicitly addressed congressional 
regulation of the slave trade, it would be odd indeed for the body to have no authority 
over the issue in the Territories. Meanwhile, the political implications of the case were as 
broad and pervasive as any in the Court’s history.  
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 Additionally, the repercussions on political processes and events were profound. 
The case had extraordinary political and economic consequences, and was a major 
contributing factor in laying the immediate groundwork for (or, at the very least, 
expediting the timeline of) the Civil War.131 The formation of the Republican Party and 
ultimate election of Abraham Lincoln was in large part attributable to the North’s 
reaction to the decision and its implications with respect to the spread of slavery in the 
Territories.132 Meanwhile, while the South hailed the decision as a vindication of its most 
cherished institution. Furthermore, according to the historian Paul Finkelman, Abraham 
Lincoln believed Dred Scott was “the first step in a Democratic conspiracy to nationalize 
slavery.”133  
The dicta in Dred Scott suggested that Congress had no power to preclude the 
expansion of slavery into the Territories, thereby upsetting the precarious political 
compromise in the Kansas-Nebraska Act that had until that time staved off a showdown. 
Under the reasoning of the case, the North would lose political power, since it was 
anticipated that many of the new states admitted would be slave states. Additionally, each 
slave would be counted towards the southern states’ populations as three-fifths of a 
person, thereby increasing the slave holding states' seats in the House of Representatives. 
Additionally, historians now believe that President Buchanan knew the result of 
the Dred Scott decision before the resolution of the case.134 During his inauguration, 
President-elect Buchanan declared that expansion of slavery into the territories was a 
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“judicial question” and that he would “cheerfully submit” to the outcome.135 However, 
Justice Grier had informed President Buchanan about the inner-workings of the Court.136 
Thus, Finkelman argues, “the Court and the President-elect worked closely to get the 
decision Buchanan and Taney wanted and to get the nation to accept it.”137 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, few newspaper articles in the South thoroughly examined 
the constitutional legitimacy of the decision.138 As the following sections will show, it is 
far less likely for the winners of substantive due process cases to dwell on the 
constitutional merits of various cases than losers. This may be because the thrill of major 
victory overshadows the desire to examine the technical arguments that pervade in the 
courtroom. However, as I see it, it is because often times the legal grounds are 
extraordinarily difficult to defend.  
Indeed, rather than exploring the legal rationale for its victory, publications from 
the Mercury paper in Charleston, South Carolina to the Richmond Inquirer lauded the 
decision as vindication of the traditions, laws, and culture of the southern people.139 
Interestingly, the South also published far fewer reactions to the case than the North— 
often merely citing a restatement of the facts or the implications of the decision itself.140  
That the Supreme Court lost legitimacy in the eyes of northern states, however, is 
beyond dispute. Rather than an exercise of clearly defined law, northerners regarded the 
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Court’s decision as the majority’s flagrant attempt to solve the “slavery question” once 
and for all. One article in the Chicago Daily Tribune declared:  
Since the organization of the government, no event has occurred that will entail 
upon the country the consequences, which are involved in this partisan movement 
of the slavery propagandists. It is the first step in a revolution which, if not 
arrested, nullifies the Revolution of '76 and makes us all slaves again.141  
 
Another article continued:  
It is in vain that we may look for power in the Constitution to establish Slavery 
anywhere. The Constitution is the charter of our Freedom, and in every sense the 
blackest, poorest or meanest man, except he be convicted of crime, is entitled to 
the fullest protection of 'Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.142 
 
And, as noted previously, historians largely agree that instead of calming the intensity of 
the slavery debate, the Dred Scott decision exacerbated the hostility that culminated in 
the Civil War.143 As such, the case marks a major turning point in both American legal 
and political history. 
 It may be properly argued that Chief Justice Taney and his Court would have 
found Dred Scott—and all black persons—ineligible for citizenship regardless of the 
doctrine employed. Indeed, judicial activism cannot be said to have begun with 
substantive due process. However, as the remainder of the historical analysis will show, 
wide-ranging authority to adjudicate along the grounds of “arbitrariness,” “justice,” 
“dignity,” or “privacy” opens doors for the Court to accomplish public policy goals that 
would otherwise be more difficult to defend. Indeed, before such a doctrine was 
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available, judges were forced to legislate the “old-fashioned” way: They lied about it.144 
To be sure, then, bad legal interpretation and judicial activism can find a foothold in other 
constitutional provisions and using other conceptual underpinnings. However, as the 
remaining case studies seek to demonstrate, the doctrine of substantive due process 
leaves adjudicative bodies particularly vulnerable to politicization.  
Perhaps it is largely for this reason that, in his dissent, Justice McLean regarded 
the decision as “more a matter of taste than of law.”145 Furthermore, Justice Benjamin 
Curtis resigned from the Supreme Court largely due to controversy and dispute 
surrounding the Dred Scott decision.146 Thus, the final criteria for politicization 
outlined—the degree of polarization among justices themselves—is clearly met in the 
current case.  
The Lochner Era and Liberty of Contract 
The Slaughter-House Cases (1873) set the precedent that the Due Process and 
Privileges and Immunities Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment did not have a 
substantive or “natural rights” component.147 This changed in Allgeyer v. Louisiana 
(1897), which was the first case to elucidate a “liberty of contract” inherent in the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Of course, since the clause addresses 
states and not the federal government, this decision also marked one of the first times the 
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Supreme Court applied natural or “unenumerated” rights jurisprudence to state 
legislation.  
The Louisiana statute in question prohibited companies from contracting with 
marine insurance firms that had not “complied in all respects with the laws of [the] 
State.”148 Since regulatory hurdles made it difficult for out-of-state insurance firms to 
legally contract with in-state companies, the state effectively steered the marine insurance 
market to those firms that operated within the state. When Allgeyer & Co sought to 
insure a shipment of cotton through Atlantic Mutual Insurance Company, which was 
based in New York City, the state filed suit.149  
Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Rufus Wheeler Peckham declared the 
following: 
The "liberty" mentioned… means the right of the citizen to be free in the 
enjoyment of all his faculties, to be free to use them in all lawful ways, to live 
and work where he will, to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling, to 
pursue any livelihood or avocation, and for that purpose to enter into all 
contracts which may be proper, necessary, and essential to his carrying out to a 
successful conclusion the purposes above mentioned… [We] do not intend to hold 
that in no such case can the state exercise its police power. When and how far 
such power may be legitimately exercised with regard to these subjects must 
be left for determination to each case as it arises…..To deprive the citizen of 
such a right as herein described without due process of law is illegal. Such a 
statute as this in question is not due process of law, because it prohibits an act 
which under the federal Constitution the defendants had a right to perform. 150 
 
Justice Peckham, perhaps the most adamant supporter of economic substantive due 
process, narrowly tailored his decision to the case at hand while altogether speaking in 
circles. Indeed, in terms of its level of obfuscation, Justice Peckham’s writing is eerily 
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similar to that of Chief Justice Taney. In short, he appears to state that the regulation 
violates the Due Process Clause because it cannot be “dignified” as due process of law.  
In this case, Allegeyer’s purported liberty interest outweighed those of the state. 
However, the scope and nature of the substantive due process doctrine were not properly 
defined by the Court. Indeed, as we shall see, establishing general rules and interpretive 
frameworks for substantive due process becomes increasingly difficult with its evolution. 
Perhaps this is because the doctrine is, by its nature, tied to “living Constitution” theory. 
How, after all, can even a rudimentary code of analysis be formulated and maintained if a 
doctrine’s limits are, by definition, allowed to evolve with social norms?  
Nonetheless, even at this preliminary stage, the battleground was set for the 
foundational battle that would pervade the substantive due process debate over the next 
four decades. The notion of economic substantive due process had its genesis in the clash 
between the state government’s police power and an individual or corporation’s liberty to 
pursue a trade, engage in an activity, or otherwise further its business interest. In this era, 
the Court took on the responsibility of weighing “natural” or “American” liberties against 
the state’s ends (often to protect workers or promote an economic policy). In doing so, 
often with heavy, longstanding ties to the business community, the federal judiciary 
overturned state legislation aimed at furthering the public good.  
Lochner v. New York (1905)  
When examined through this lens, it is clear how the Allgeyer case paved the way 
for Lochner v. New York (1905), which appropriately gave the era of economic 
substantive due process its name. The state law in dispute prohibited owners of bakeries 
from allowing their employees to work more than 60 hours a week or 10 hours in a 
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day.151 After repeatedly violating the statute, Joseph Lochner, the owner of a small 
bakeshop, filed suit. Once appealing and losing his case in the state’s highest court, he 
was granted a writ of certiorari to bring his case before the Supreme Court. Delivering the 
opinion of the Court, Justice Rufus Peckham again underscored the newly fashioned 
“realm” protected by the Due Process Clause:  
The general right to make a contract in relation to his business is part of the 
liberty of the individual protected by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal 
Constitution…. The right to purchase or to sell labor is part of the liberty 
protected by this amendment unless there are circumstances which exclude the 
right.152 
 
The State of New York rested its case on the assertion that, at the time, bakers faced 
particularly adverse working conditions. According to Professor Hirt in his treatise on the 
Diseases of the Workers: 
The constant inhaling of flour dust causes inflammation of the lungs and of the 
bronchial tubes. The eyes also suffer through this dust, which is responsible for 
the many cases of running eyes among the bakers. The long hours of toil to which 
all bakers are subjected produce rheumatism, cramps and swollen legs. The 
intense heat in the workshops induces the workers to resort to cooling drinks, 
which, together with their habit of exposing the greater part of their bodies to the 
change in the atmosphere, is another source of a number of diseases of various 
organs.153  
 
Despite evidence from health experts indicating the benefit of limiting bakers’ working 
hours to 60 hours per week (or ten per day), the Court overturned New York’s law, 
holding that it did not fall within the jurisdiction’s legitimate police powers. Instead, the 
majority found that the state’s health concerns were invalid. Therefore, since there was 
no “material danger to the public health or health of the employees,” it was declared that:  
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the individuals whose rights are thus made the subject of legislative interference 
are under the protection of the Federal Constitution regarding their liberty of 
contract as well as of person, and the legislature of the State has no power to limit 
their right as proposed in this statute.154  
 
In this manner, the Court enunciated a substantive element to the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause.  
Interestingly, perhaps the clearest evidence that the Lochner decision’s 
substantive due process basis politicized the Supreme Court is found in the dissenting 
opinions. Joined by Justices White and Day, Justice Harlan scribed one of the most 
famous dissents in American constitutional history—an opinion that admitted there may 
be a valid “liberty of contract” concept embedded in the Fourteenth Amendment, but 
found that this right was not absolute: 
I take it to be firmly established that what is called the liberty of contract may, 
within certain limits, be subjected to regulations designed and calculated to 
promote the general welfare or to guard the public health, the public morals or the 
public safety.155 
 
Thus, rather than negating the validity of the substantive due process doctrine entirely, 
Justice Harlan merely disagreed on its scope, and whether it was exceeded in this 
particular case. In support of his assertion, he cited Jacobson v. Massachusetts (1905):  
The liberty secured by the Constitution of the United States to every person 
within its jurisdiction does not import… an absolute right in each person to be, at 
all times and in all circumstances, wholly freed from restraint.156  
 
In this manner, Justice Harlan’s decision appears to be more about deference to the 
legislative realm than a rejection of the liberty of contract concept. Unless a public policy 
measure duly enacted by the states and aimed at furthering the public interest in some 
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meaningful way was “plainly, palpably” and “beyond all question” inconsistent with the 
Constitution of the United States, Justice Harlan argued, the Court should presume good-
faith on the part of the legislative body.157 Only as a consequence of the Court’s error in 
refraining from deference, then, did the dissent find fault with the majority’s decision. In 
this regard, the Court improperly resolved matters: 
which have been supposed to belong exclusively to the legislative departments of 
the several States exerting their conceded power to guard the health and safety of 
their citizens by such regulations as they in their wisdom deem best.158  
 
As a result, Justice Harlan somewhat narrowly tailored his critique while simultaneously 
asserting that the precedent set may “seriously cripple the inherent power of the States.” 
While Justice John Marshall Harlan’s is potentially the more famous of the two, 
Justice Holmes’ dissent was an equally (if not more) scathing rebuke of the 5-4 
majority’s opinion: 
This case is decided upon an economic theory which a large part of the country 
does not entertain. If it were a question whether I agreed with that theory, I should 
desire to study it further and long before making up my mind. But I do not 
conceive that to be my duty, because I strongly believe that my agreement or 
disagreement has nothing to do with the right of a majority to embody their 
opinions in law. It is settled by various decisions of this court that state 
constitutions and state laws may regulate life in many ways which we, as 
legislators, might think as injudicious, or, if you like, as tyrannical, as this, and 
which, equally with this, interfere with the liberty to contract...a constitution is not 
intended to embody a particular economic theory, whether of paternalism and the 
organic relation of the citizen to the State or of laissez faire…. It is made for 
people of fundamentally differing views, and the accident of our finding certain 
opinions natural and familiar or novel and even shocking ought not to conclude 
our judgment upon the question whether statutes embodying them conflict with 
the Constitution of the United States…. I think that the word liberty in the 
Fourteenth Amendment is perverted when it is held to prevent the natural 
outcome of a dominant opinion, unless it can be said that a rational and fair 
man necessarily would admit that the statute proposed would infringe 
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fundamental principles as they have been understood by the traditions of our 
people and our law.159 
 
The short, decisively written dissent struck to the very heart of the matter. Interestingly, 
though, even Justice Holmes admitted in his last paragraph that the Fourteenth 
Amendment may allow for some form of natural law jurisprudence. However, if 
anything, his incisive dissent underscored the great problem of substantive due process: 
Many rational and fair men may reasonably disagree on what constitutes “fundamental 
principles” or the “traditions of our people.” Unless Justice Holmes was willing to accuse 
his colleagues of purposefully distorting the Constitution to accomplish political ends, he 
must have assumed that they honestly believed the liberty of contract theory to be a 
“fundamental principle” that was embedded in the “traditions of our people.” And while 
he may, in fact, have been accusing his fellow justices of outright, intentionally 
unfounded judicial activism, this is far from clear. Rather, his colleagues may have 
simply had a different perception of what constituted a natural right.  
American scholarly and legal disapproval of the Lochner decision and its 
aftermath is well documented and extensive. In fact, according to Professor Amar Akhil 
at Yale Law School: 
the very word “Lochner” is for legal insiders synonymous with judicial overreach. 
Lochner is thus not just a case, but an era and an attitude. In legal discourse it has 
even become a verb. To “Lochner” or to “Lochnerize” is to commit the same kind 
of judicial sin that characterized many of the Court’s rulings in what is now 
known as “the Lochner era” — roughly the mid-1880s through the mid-1930s — 
in which the Court without clear textual warrant struck down a multitude of 
reasonable reform statutes regulating free-market excesses160 
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In fact, the nearly universal denunciation of the Lochner case and its progeny has had 
repercussions for constitutional drafting and legal interpretation across the globe. For 
example, Pierre Trudeau was well aware of the use of the substantive due process to 
strike down minimum wage, child labor, and work hour legislation,161 and took steps to 
insulate Canada’s Charter from the effects of the doctrine. In front of the Special Joint 
Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons on the Constitution in 1970, Barry 
Strayer, who was responsible for drafting Canada’s 1969 constitutional proposals, noted 
that due process created problems under the American Constitution in relation to liberty 
and property, stating: “It has been used by the courts to strike down legislation which the 
majority of Americans apparently regard as being socially desirable.”162 Ultimately, in 
order to avoid the possibility of the Canadian court system adopting some form of 
economic substantive due process, he included a Due Process Clause in his draft which 
omitted the protection of property in place of “security of person.”163  
While recent attempts have been made by economic libertarian scholars such as 
David Bernstein and others to “rehabilitate” Lochner, the majority of legal scholars 
continue to hold the view of legal philosopher Ronald Dworkin, who observed that 
Lochner is the “whipping boy” of American constitutional law.164  
Lochner’s Politicizing Effects 
Given that Lochner is still widely deemed to be synonymous with judicial 
activism, it is somewhat hard to imagine how the decision would not politicize the 
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Supreme Court. Indeed, if one wanted to turn the Court into an effective policy-making 
body, “judicial activism” would be the way to go. However, it is worthwhile to assess 
Lochner through more structured framework for measuring politicization. 
First, though, it is impossible to address the political nature of the Lochner 
decision and its aftermath without thoroughly examining the Court’s connection to the 
industrial titans (as well as the laissez-faire philosophy) that dominated the day. Indeed, 
Justice Peckham was a close friend and advisor to a variety of business leaders including 
John Rockefeller, John Pierpont Morgan, Sr., and Cornelius Vanderbilt.165 When not in 
public service, Peckham often served as their legal counsel, and he also had close 
connections with fellow members of the Board of Trustees for the Mutual Life Insurance 
Company of New York.166 And, while it should be duly noted that Peckham often voted 
to break up large businesses in antitrust cases,167 his personal life nonetheless explains his 
largely pro-business judicial leanings. 
In fact, it is no coincidence that the Supreme Court, and the legal profession 
generally, maintained a firm commitment to the liberty of contract doctrine. According to 
the Oxford scholar Edward Corwin, the American Bar Association (founded in 1878):  
became a sort of juristic sewing circle for mutual education in the gospel of 
laissez faire… The country was presented with a new, up-to-date version of 
natural law… The guarantees which the Constitution affords private rights were 
intended to supply, above all other things, a legal and political sanction to the 
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laws of political economy and to the process of evolution as forecast by Herbert 
Spencer.168 
 
In stark contrast with the revival of substantive due process in the 1960s, the Lochner era 
reflected judicial activism with a conservative, capitalistic bent. According to John P. 
Frank: the “new bench was chosen from a bar which had imbedded that part of the 
truncated philosophy of laissez-faire which became popular among lawyers for enterprise 
in the last half of the nineteenth century.”169 Thus, particularly among affluent, educated 
circles, almost religious-like credence was regularly given to capitalistic, anti-regulation, 
and union-busting policies. 
It is with this background that the previously expounded factors concerning 
Lochner’s politicizing effects will be analyzed. First, it appears clear that the Lochner 
decision and its progeny constituted controversial decisions that were important to the 
public and inconsistent with the strongly held views of a not insubstantial sector of the 
public, and these decisions were based on a rationale that is obscure. It is readily apparent 
from the dissenting opinion written by Justice Holmes that the Lochner case was decided 
based on an economic view that a large swath of the country “did not entertain.” The 
obscurity of the doctrine, too, is evident from the fact that the Court consistently chose to 
evaluate its limits on a case-by-case basis. Rather than clearly defining what, precisely, 
was within its grounds, the Court simply decided to pick and choose what legislation it 
would find sufficiently obtrusive to its notion of “liberty.” 
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The second factor relates to the extent to which the Supreme Court deviates (or 
appears to deviate) from established norms to reach a particular result in cases that have 
broad political implications. Here, too, it appears that the Lochner approach registered as 
highly political: While the stage was set for liberty of contract jurisprudence in Allgeyer, 
the doctrine was both novel and relatively obscure. Additionally, the Lochner approach to 
economic legislation certainly had broad political implications: As Justice Harlan 
observed, the failure of the Court to defer to legislative bodies in these matters would 
deprive them of their legitimate police powers, which could “cripple” their ability to 
perform the basic functions of a modern state. Finally, with respect to the fifth and final 
factor—the degree to which Supreme Court justices are polarized along the legal 
spectrum—the extent of politicization is also evident from Holmes’ dissent, which was 
one of the most accusatory of judicial activism in the Court’s history. The third and 
fourth factors—the extent to which Supreme Court composition is the focus of political 
processes, including election rhetoric, voting processes, and Supreme Court 
nominations—requires further discussion. 
 The high regard for property rights (and, by extension, the notion that liberty of 
contract was fundamental) among elites and the dissenting view of the growing industrial 
underclass meant that the Lochner opinion received mixed responses from various areas 
of the country. The Los Angeles Times, New York Times, New York Herald, and Dallas 
Morning News, for example, all supported the outcome, with some publications declaring 
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it a victory for the “sacred rights of the freeman” and a much-needed prospective blow to 
the strike to the tyranny of socialist rule.170 
Of course, others were more hostile to the decision. Shortly after its release, The 
Baker’s Journal declared that Lochner was “the hardest blow ever dealt by the courts of 
this country to organized labor”171 and later issued an article asserting the following; 
 [t]he bakery workers die like flies, of consumption, rheumatism and other 
physical punishments for the breaking of nature’s laws. But what do the learned 
justices care for the laws of nature? Capitalist laws are alone sacred to them! 
What are wage workers for but to be exploited!172 
 
While none ultimately followed through, 85,000 bakers threatened to strike and cause a 
bread famine.173 The Worker, a prominent socialist newspaper, declared the outcome of 
the Lochner case, “a new Dred Scott decision.”174 As such, it is clear that unions across 
the country regarded the decision as a highly political one. As put by Victoria Nourse at 
the Georgetown Law Center: 
Such cases sent children to the mills and sweatshops, allowed employers to 
prevent individuals from joining unions, restricted the ability of unions to boycott, 
and kept minimum wage and hour legislation for able-bodied men in litigation 
limbo for thirty years. People demonstrated, fought, and voted based on these 
issues; these cases left such an important impression because there were focal 
points for the discontent of great masses of people.175 
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With industrialization rapidly changing the economic landscape of the United States, 
government’s role in shaping the public’s social outlook and fiscal welfare needed to 
evolve. For many urban, working class people, the Court came to represent an out-of-
touch institutional body that had appropriated the authority (and, some would say, 
exercised the audacity) to overrule the democratic will of society’s most vulnerable.  
The decision also clearly impacted election rhetoric and politicians’ views of the 
judiciary. The 1912 Progressive party platform supported “such restrictions of the power 
of the courts as shall leave to the people the ultimate authority to determine fundamental 
questions of social welfare and public policy.”176 Insofar as the judiciary commandeers 
the authority to settle questions rightly left to the people and their respective legislatures, 
this may be regarded as politicization in and of itself.  
However, it was Theodore Roosevelt who became one of Lochner’s most avid 
critics. While he did not specifically deny the existence of a liberty of contract, Roosevelt 
publicly criticized the decision because it fundamentally disregarded the will of the 
people to decide a question of public policy that he believed rightly fell within the 
legislative realm. The decision, he declared, was “nominally against State rights… but 
really against popular rights, against the democratic principle of government by the 
people under the forms of law.”177 At a later date, he further articulated his position: 
In the New York Bakeshop Case it is our duty to say that it is for the people of a 
State to decide whether they intend to be true to the school of political economy 
of the eighteenth century individualism philosophers or whether they intend to act 
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on the principles set forth in such books as those of Professor Rose on “Social 
Control” and by Father Ryan on “A Living Wage.”178 
 
Thus, while he did not attack the notion of substantive due process doctrine as faulty 
jurisprudence in and of itself, he did bristle at the notion that judicial intervention 
undermined the will of the people, as reflected in duly enacted legislation. When running 
in the 2012 presidential election, Roosevelt called Lochner a manifestation of judicial 
“tyranny.”179 And, while Woodrow Wilson ultimately won the election, then-President 
Taft believed the Constitution was the “supreme issue” of the race.180 
The Lochner case set a longstanding federal legal precedent under which the 
Court struck down the regulation of the sale of securities, standardization of the price of 
gasoline, and other state measures.181 In light of the number of cases that followed in 
Lochner’s footsteps and the impact these cases had on the lives of an increasingly 
disgruntled working class, it is no wonder that “Lochner” is among the only Supreme 
Court cases to give birth to an “era.” For these reasons—and based on a structured 
analysis—it appears clear that the Lochner decision is accurately associated with 
increased politicization of the Supreme Court and the judiciary generally. 
 However, it could be argued that Lochner’s politicizing effects were ultimately 
short-lived and relatively less pronounced than the case studies to be examined in the 
latter half of the 20th century. Indeed, Lochner’s legacy was tempered by the Court’s 
return to a more fact and circumstance-based jurisprudence. In contrast to the Lochner 
decision, which relied heavily on abstract principle, subsequent “liberty of contract” 
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cases began to look much more seriously at the present conditions and particulars of the 
legislation at issue. For example, in Muller v. Oregon (1908), the Court upheld a law 
limiting the work of women in factories due to their “physical structure.”182 According to 
Sidney G. Tarrow’s “Lochner versus New York: A Political Analysis,” this marked a 
turning point from which the Court softened its strict adherence to the liberty of contract 
doctrine and began to examine legislation “in the light of actual industrial conditions, 
unlike their approach in the Lochner case.”183 
 Consider the following quote by Stephenson in “The Supreme Court and 
Constitutional Change: Lochner v. New York”: 
The Lochner litigation was one of the first opportunities presented for 
constitutional confirmation of the modern regulatory state. Debate over the 
constitutionality of the New York statute symbolized the broader dispute over 
fundamental changes in the fabric of the American polity.184 
 
The case indeed came at a time of rapid political and economic change for the nation. 
Ultimately, organized labor and many of its policies won the policy landscape through 
the democratic process. As the court adjusted (or softened) its judicial philosophy 
concerning substantive due process, the politicization of the Court as a potent election 
issue dissipated. Particularly with World War I, the country at large faced pressing 
challenges that threatened to compromise the stability of global relations, leaving 
substantially less air time for bakers’ hours. As Professor Nourse observed:  
The Progressive Era… was full of reform and regulation… from consumer 
protection and the federal reserve to worker’s compensation; from regulations of 
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drink, lotteries, fight films, and stolen cars to seditious speech to birth control—
and the Court’s case law did little to squelch any of these regulatory impulses, for 
good or ill185 
 
Thus, it appears that despite the Court’s convictions regarding the centrality of a 
fundamental right to contract found nowhere in the constitutional text, the democratic 
process was simply too powerful for even the most activist Court to oppose indefinitely. 
For this reason, the politicization of the Supreme Court in this era became fully realized 
at its tail end, but was ultimately extinguished with West Coast Hotel v. Parrish 
(1937).186 Only with the nation in the midst of the Great Depression and the President 
attempting to “pack” the Court did the body abandon its stringent final stand on economic 
regulations.  
Privacy, “Penumbras,” and Substantive Due Process 
 In order to understand natural rights jurisprudence in the 21st century, it is first 
necessary to trace the rebirth and evolution of substantive due process beginning in the 
1960s. For almost 30 years after the end of the Lochner era, the doctrine was scorned as a 
blemish on American constitutional history.187 However, its revitalization has marked an 
interesting trend since the 1960s: in general, the American public increasingly favor the 
rights protected by the Court in this new period. Access to contraception, abortion, and 
other “private” privileges against intrusion from the state are all concepts that, from a 
political perspective, many Americans (if not an emerging majority) appear willing to 
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support at the ballot box. However, this does not necessarily make these public policies 
constitutional rights.  
The Court’s decision to embrace this unique, new form of substantive due process 
certainly has enlarged its scope to include rulings on intimate questions previously 
reserved to the political arena. Largely as a consequence, our Supreme Court (and the 
federal judiciary generally) has experienced the political attention, scrutiny, and 
polarization it does today. In discussing this phenomenon, this chapter will examine three 
landmark cases: Griswold v. Connecticut (1965), Roe v. Wade (1973), and Planned 
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey (1992). After outlining the decisions 
themselves, this paper then analyzes their implications with respect to the politicization 
of the Supreme Court. 
Griswold v. Connecticut (1965) 
Although the notion of a constitutional “right to privacy” (particularly in the form 
of bodily autonomy) was most famously solidified in popular culture by Roe v. Wade 
(1973), the understanding that the Constitution implies such a liberty without its explicit 
mention developed from Griswold v. Connecticut (1965). In this case, the named 
appellant, Estelle Griswold, the Executive Director of Planned Parenthood League of 
Connecticut, challenged Section §§ 53-32 of the Connecticut General Statutes, which 
stated:  
Any person who uses any drug, medicinal article or instrument for the purpose of 
preventing conception shall be fined not less than fifty dollars or imprisoned not 
less than sixty days nor more than one year or be both fined and imprisoned.188 
 
In addition, Section 54-196 held: 
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Any person who assists, abets, counsels, causes, hires or commands another to 
commit any offense may be prosecuted and punished as if he were the principal 
offender.189 
 
The Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut provided counsel on contraception to 
both married and unmarried couples. When found in violation of these state laws, 
Griswold and others were fined $100 each.190 They then sued in state court, asserting that 
the statute violated an implied constitutional right to marital privacy. 
In the 7-2 majority opinion, Justice Douglas remarked that a number of the 
provisions in the Bill of Rights were indirectly implicated by the questions posed in 
Griswold v. Connecticut. For example, while the First Amendment holds no scripted right 
of “association,” the Court had repeatedly affirmed the right to gather in means that were 
of “social, legal, and economic benefit [to] the members.”191 Justice Douglas continued: 
The right of "association”... includes the right to express one's attitudes or 
philosophies by membership in a group or by affiliation with it or by other lawful 
means. Association in that context is a form of expression of opinion, and, while 
it is not expressly included in the First Amendment, its existence is necessary in 
making the express guarantees fully meaningful.192 
 
In a similar manner, Justice Douglas contended that the notion of “privacy” is found 
throughout the Bill of Rights, and that insofar as the common thread can be reasonably 
discerned, its application must be consequential. The Third Amendment prohibits the 
quartering of soldiers during peacetime in private houses. The Fourth Amendment 
affirms the “right of the people to be secure… against unreasonable searches and 
seizures.”193 Meanwhile the Fifth Amendment right to protection against self-
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incrimination affords citizens a so-called “zone” of privacy that government may not 
force him to surrender to his detriment. And, finally, the Ninth Amendment provides that 
the written proclamation of various rights “shall not be construed to deny or disparage 
others retained by the people.”194 By tying these Amendments together, Justice Douglas 
painted a picture of the “emanations” and “penumbras” he used to justify the remainder 
of his decision. 195 
Relying on this string of assertions, Justice Douglas then contended that the 
Griswold case before the Court “concerns a relationship lying within the zone of privacy 
created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees.”196 He wrote:  
We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights—older than our 
political parties, older than our school system. Marriage is a coming together for 
better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being 
sacred. It is an association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in 
living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects. 
Yet it is an association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior 
decisions.197 
 
Insofar as the law remained in this realm, the governmental purpose “may not be 
achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of 
protected freedoms."198 Furthermore, since robust enforcement of the Connecticut statute 
would require governmental search and intrusion into the bedrooms of married couples, 
he alleged the law “is repulsive to the notions of privacy surrounding the marriage 
relationship.”199 
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Indeed, the Connecticut law was repugnant to ordered conceptions of marital 
unions. However, robust reading of the law requires more than mere associative 
reasoning about abstract ideas. Any astute observer should understand that the text of the 
First, Third, and Fourth Amendments imply, in some sense, a certain right of privacy 
against the state. However, this is the case for virtually any law proclaiming that the 
government cannot do something. The Bill of Rights was, of course, precisely designed 
to achieve this purpose. By definition, when a restriction on government intervention 
exists, some corollary private liberty resides explicitly for the people. With that being 
said, a specifically enumerated provision in the Bill of Rights need not imply any 
protection for rights not explicitly mentioned (with the obvious exception of the Ninth 
Amendment). While the notion of state authorities barging into the bedrooms of intimate 
couples to determine whether they use contraception is surely offensive to the notion of 
civil liberty, Justice Douglas failed to seriously formulate his reasoning from the 
constitutional text itself. Rather, he extrapolated from various unconnected Amendments 
in order to reach a conclusion that while viscerally agreeable and politically expedient, is 
legally problematic. 
It is of note that Justice Douglas grounded his decision by connecting the alleged 
right of marital privacy to a value that is fundamental in nature to American social life. 
Thus, he voted to side with the majority not because he disliked the Connecticut law 
(although he almost surely did), but because it was antithetical to a deeply-rooted 
institution. Thus, the ruling was grounded in the Court’s understanding of a fundamental 
social institution that was “older than the Bill of Rights—older than our political 
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parties…”200 This analysis is very different than that developed by the Supreme Court in 
the coming decades, which, as discussed below, focused on the personal autonomy of the 
individual, “respect,” or “dignity.” Meanwhile, the liberties protected by Griswold v. 
Connecticut were those supposedly essential to our historical traditions. In the future, 
Justice Scalia would remark on how this would change: 
Within the last 20 years, we have found to be covered by due process the right to 
abortion, which was so little rooted in the traditions of the American people that it 
was criminal for 200 years; the right to homosexual sodomy, which was so little 
rooted in the traditions of the American people that it was criminal for 200 
years.201 
 
At some point, then, the Court would begin to more boldly substitute its moral 
judgements for those of various legislatures. However, in the seminal case of Griswold v. 
Connecticut (1965), the Court’s decision was rooted in the essentially historical 
observation that there was something deeply un-American in a law that invaded the 
bedrooms of married couples.  
Regardless, a textualist approach to constitutional interpretation would support 
Justice Black’s dissent: “The Court talks about a constitutional "right of privacy" as 
though there is some constitutional provision or provisions forbidding any law ever to be 
passed which might abridge the "privacy" of individuals. But there is not.”202 Justice 
Black contended that substantive due process provided the Court a kind of “blank check” 
to invalidate laws that it deemed improper, rather than illegal. He stated: 
The due process argument… is vested with power to invalidate all state laws that 
it considers to be arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, or oppressive, or on this 
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Court's belief that a particular state law under scrutiny has no "rational or 
justifying" purpose, or is offensive to a "sense of fairness and justice." If these 
formulas based on "natural justice"... are to prevail, they require judges to 
determine what is or is not constitutional on the basis of their own appraisal 
of what laws are unwise or unnecessary. The power to make such decisions 
is, of course, that of a legislative body. 203 
 
Justice Black was precisely right. Throughout his tenure on the Supreme Court, Justice 
Black continually employed his strict adherence to the text of the Constitution in order to 
defend the system of governance the Framers intended. As he once told the New York 
Times in 1967, “I was against using due process to force the views of judges on the 
country. I still am. I wouldn’t trust judges with that kind of power and the Founders did 
not trust them either.”204 Whether against “economic liberty” arguments in cases such 
Carolene Products (1937) or privacy contentions in the final terms of his tenure, Justice 
Black vigorously denounced substantive due process even when doing so was 
inconsistent with his own personal, political preferences.  
It is noteworthy that Justice John Marshall Harlan II’s dissent in Poe v. Ullman 
(1961), the predecessor case to Griswold v. Connecticut, provided one of the most 
strident (and oft cited) defenses of substantive due process to date. In it, Justice Harlan 
asserted that the liberty implied in the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause 
prescribed "a rational continuum which, broadly speaking, includes a freedom from all 
substantial arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints."205 Unfortunately, the 
difficulty in adjudicating along such lines is determining what is “arbitrary” or 
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“purposeless” and what is not. While liberal legal scholars often hail the dissent as one of 
the pre-eminent, early defenses of the doctrine, Justice Harlan specifically rejected the 
notion that the due process doctrine could be stretched to the lengths it reaches today:  
The laws regarding marriage which provide both when the sexual powers may be 
used and the legal and societal context in which children are born and brought up, 
as well as laws forbidding adultery, fornication and homosexual practices 
which express the negative of the proposition, confining sexuality to lawful 
marriage, form a pattern so deeply pressed into the substance of our social 
life that any Constitutional doctrine in this area must build upon that 
basis….It is one thing when the State exerts its power either to forbid 
extramarital sexuality altogether, or to say who may marry, but it is quite 
another when, having acknowledged a marriage and the intimacies inherent in it, 
it undertakes to regulate by means of the criminal law the details of that 
intimacy.206 
 
Thus, it is clear that (at least at the time of the Griswold ruling) the scope of due process 
was dependent on what was “deeply pressed into the substance” of American social life. 
50 years ago, same-sex relations, extramarital sexuality, and a myriad of other social 
mores did not fall into this category.  
It should perhaps be emphasized that even justices who are deeply concerned 
about judicial overreach via the Due Process Clause fail to adequately account for the 
power their precedents may set. According to Justice Byron White in his dissenting 
opinion in Moore v. East Cleveland (1977), "no one was more sensitive than Mr. Justice 
Harlan to any suggestion that his approach to the Due Process Clause would lead to 
judges roaming at large in the constitutional field."207 As we will see in the coming 
sections, notions of “privacy” or “personal liberty” allegedly embedded in the Fourteenth 
Amendment have expanded tremendously since Griswold. Indeed, Justice Kennedy 
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regarded Griswold as the “most pertinent beginning point”208 for the reasoning he would 
employ in Lawrence v. Texas (2003).  
 Often, like in Griswold, subsequent due process decisions are similarly reasonable 
from a political or social standpoint. However, from a legal perspective, it appears that 
the scope of due process is defined by what particular justices believe is “arbitrary” at a 
certain point in time. As such, its limits are extraordinarily vague and difficult to define, 
let alone maintain.  
Roe v. Wade (1973) 
Although the notion that substantive due process protects various aspects of 
private life was solidified in Griswold v. Connecticut, Stanley v. Georgia, Meyer v. 
Nebraska, as well as several other cases, Roe v. Wade (1973) remains the best known 
modern case addressing the scope of the Due Process Clause in the context of private life. 
In it, Norma L. McCorvey (known as “Jane Doe”), a resident of Texas, sought an 
abortion in her home state of Texas.209 At the time, Articles 1191-1194 and 1196 of the 
Texas Penal Code made it illegal for women to have an abortion unless it was “procured 
or attempted by medical advice for the purpose of saving the life of the mother."210 After 
attempting and failing to obtain an abortion, she filed suit against Henry Wade, the 
District Attorney for Dallas County, alleging that the Texas statutes were 
unconstitutionally vague and that they abridged her right of personal privacy, protected 
by the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments.211 
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Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the Court. In his decision, he declared 
that despite the deep philosophical, religious, and personal implications of abortion 
statutes, “Our task, of course, is to resolve the issue by constitutional measurement, free 
of emotion and of predilection.”212 Before delving into the heart of the argument, 
Blackmun proceeded to do a deep dive into the ancient history of abortion in an apparent 
attempt to discredit the validity of the state prohibition (and similar, modern statutes 
across the country). He noted that, “it perhaps is not generally appreciated that the 
restrictive criminal abortion laws in effect in a majority of States today are of relatively 
recent vintage.”213 However, the validity of such an assertion as well as the robust 
backstory is not relevant to solving the case at hand.  
He then stated:  
This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's 
concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action, as we feel it is, or, as 
the District Court determined, in the Ninth Amendment’s reservation of rights to 
the people, is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to 
terminate her pregnancy.214  
 
Of course, as noted previously, the text of the Fourteenth Amendment itself merely 
makes clear that an individual may, in fact, be deprived of his life, liberty, or property, as 
long as the deprivation is done in accordance with “due process.” And while 
unenumerated or “natural rights” jurisprudence philosophy is arguably consistent with a 
textualist reading of the Ninth Amendment, it is far from clear that the right to an 
abortion is one reserved “to the people” rather than a matter of public policy reserved to 
the state. Furthermore, such an understanding requires neglect of various historical 
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circumstances in addition to abstract, principle-based reasoning. Justice Blackmun 
continued: 
As noted above, a State may properly assert important interests in safeguarding 
health, in maintaining medical standards, and in protecting potential life. At some 
point in pregnancy, these respective interests become sufficiently compelling to 
sustain regulation of the factors that govern the abortion decision. The privacy 
right involved, therefore, cannot be said to be absolute…. We, therefore, conclude 
that the right of personal privacy includes the abortion decision, but that this right 
is not unqualified and must be considered against important state interests in 
regulation.215 
 
Weighing the state interest against that of the pregnant mother, however, is precisely 
what the Texas state legislature had already done. Again, such a “balancing act” is 
emphatically not the prerogative of the Courts or the judicial branch.  
Blackmun’s concession that, at “some point,” the “state interests as to protection 
of health, medical standards, and prenatal life, become dominant” made clear that such 
priorities may be compelling.216 Indeed, the rationale for state action in this area was 
explained at length early in the opinion:  
The State’s interest and general obligation to protect life then extends, it is 
argued, to prenatal life… recognition may be given to the less rigid claim that as 
long as at least potential life is involved, the State may assert interests beyond the 
protection of the pregnant woman alone.217  
 
However, the honorable Justice believed that the state’s interest was to be given 
substantial weight only after the first trimester. Why, precisely, is far from clear.  
Interestingly, Justice Blackmun’s first draft of the Roe opinion was less sweeping 
than the final version.218 Preliminarily, the right to an abortion would be extended only to 
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the first trimester of pregnancy. However, after a suggestion from Justice Lewis Powell’s 
clerk, the time frame was extended.219 Since 90 percent of abortions take place in the first 
trimester, Professor Klarman remarked that: 
late-term abortions are a symbolic issue but one of great potency, as Republicans 
have shown in the last 15 years. Roe put the court on the wrong side of public 
opinion by extending the right beyond what the public was willing to accept.220 
 
Thus, the error of Roe was twofold: First, and most importantly, Justice Blackmun 
employed suspect legal doctrine to undermine the democratic will of dozens of states and 
millions of Americans. Second, he extended the scope of his decision far beyond where 
he needed to in order to accomplish the crux of his agenda. 
On the other side of the debate, Justice White’s scathing dissent lashed his 
colleagues for their alleged judicial overreach:  
I find nothing in the language or history of the Constitution to support the Court's 
judgment. The Court simply fashions and announces a new constitutional right for 
pregnant women and, with scarcely any reason or authority for its action, invests 
that right with sufficient substance to override most existing state abortion 
statutes. The upshot is that the people and the legislatures of the 50 States are 
constitutionally disentitled to weigh the relative importance of the continued 
existence and development of the fetus, on the one hand, against a spectrum 
of possible impacts on the woman, on the other hand. As an exercise of raw 
judicial power, the Court perhaps has authority to do what it does today; 
but, in my view, its judgment is an improvident and extravagant exercise of 
the power of judicial review that the Constitution extends to this Court.221 
 
By declaring that only at a certain point in a woman’s pregnancy was the life of the fetus 
a compelling interest for the state, Justice Blackmun and the majority exempted the issue 
of abortion (at least in large part) from the democratic process. As the following section 
will demonstrate, the “realm(s)” protected by substantive due process has grown even 
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further since Roe. Indeed, its expansion has risen to the point where it is exercised in lieu 
of more applicable constitutional provisions and doctrines.  
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey (1992) 
The Court revisited the issue of abortion in Planned Parenthood v. Casey (1992). 
At this point in the Rehnquist Court’s era, conservatives appeared poised to overturn the 
Roe ruling with the votes of Justices Sandra Day O’Connor, Antonin Scalia, Clarence 
Thomas, David Souter, and the Chief Justice himself. Additionally, Justice White (who 
was appointed by a Democrat), had originally dissented in Roe, as well. As part of a 
promise on the campaign trail, Republican presidential candidate Ronald Reagan pledged 
to nominate a woman to the highest bench in the land.222 Especially towards the end of 
O’Connor’s tenure on the Supreme Court, her record demonstrated herself to be much 
more of centrist than many initially anticipated. To some legal analysts’ surprise, 
O’Connor, Souter, and Kennedy voted to uphold the “essential holding” in Roe: 
Concluding that consideration of the fundamental constitutional question resolved 
by Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, principles of institutional integrity, and the rule of 
stare decisis require that Roe’s essential holding be retained and reaffirmed… At 
the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence, of 
meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these 
matters could not define the attributes of personhood were they formed under 
compulsion of the State.223 
 
This was surely the most bold—and almost certainly most romantic—description of what 
is encompassed by substantive due process. How such a proposition should be applied is 
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not entirely clear, and the Court refrained from establishing a structured system or 
framework for future cases.  
Furthermore, the decision stated: 
Overruling Roe’s central holding would not only reach an unjustifiable result 
under stare decisis principles, but would seriously weaken the Court’s capacity to 
exercise the judicial power and to function as the Supreme Court of a Nation 
dedicated to the rule of law.224 
 
First and foremost, Planned Parenthood affirmed the conclusion reached in Roe that the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause encompasses a substantive element to the 
word “liberty” that protects a woman’s qualified right to bodily autonomy, and therefore 
abortion. However, the decision also explained at length the importance of the doctrine of 
stare decisis. The opinion stated that when having decided an issue of “national 
controversy” by “accepting a common mandate rooted in the Constitution,’ the Court 
must be extremely cautious not to be guilty of or giving the perception of being guilty of, 
“surrender[ing] to political pressure.”225  
Indeed, in the long run, constantly changing precedent may threaten to undermine 
the credibility of the Court system and rule of law generally. However, in and of itself, 
precedent can only tell us what was done, not what was done well. Furthermore, failing to 
overturn bad rulings simply because they were declared recently is, in fact, taking 
political considerations into judicial decision-making. As noted by Justice Rehnquist's 
opinion:  
Under this principle, when the Court has ruled on a divisive issue, it is apparently 
prevented from overruling that decision for the sole reason that it was incorrect, 
unless opposition to the original decision has died away.226 
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Such an understanding of stare decisis would be truly novel and, perhaps even more 
importantly, dangerous to the role of the Court. Indeed, as argued by Justice Scalia, in its 
effort not to appear overly political, the Court arguably swayed in the other direction: 
The only principle the Court “adheres” to, it seems to me, is the principle that the 
Court must be seen as standing by Roe. That is not a principle of law (which is 
what I thought the Court was talking about), but a principle of Realpolitik—and a 
wrong one at that.227 
 
In response to the heart of the argument proposed by the majority opinion, Justice Scalia 
continued:  
The permissibility of abortion, and the limitations upon it, are to be resolved like 
most important questions in our democracy: by citizens trying to persuade one 
another and then voting….How upsetting it is, that so many of our citizens 
(good people, not lawless ones, on both sides of this abortion issue, and on 
various sides of other issues as well) think that we Justices should properly take 
into account their views, as though we were engaged not in ascertaining an 
objective law but in determining some kind of social consensus. The Court would 
profit, I think, from giving less attention to the fact of this distressing 
phenomenon, and more attention to the cause of it. That cause permeates today’s 
opinion: a new mode of constitutional adjudication that relies not upon text 
and traditional practice to determine the law, but upon what the Court calls 
“reasoned judgment,” which turns out to be nothing but philosophical 
predilection and moral intuition. 228 
 
This excerpt perfectly synthesized the overarching problem with an overly expansive, 
substantive interpretation of the Due Process Clause or Ninth Amendment. In order to 
protect various “essential spheres of liberty,” regardless of how politically appealing or 
apparently “natural,” the judiciary necessarily deprives citizens of their democratic right 
to resolve the issue themselves. While they may not reach the correct, satisfactory, or 
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even moral decision, the ultimate right to determine public policy is their own. Indeed, it 
is not altogether surprising that Justice Scalia equated the judgment of the Court that day 
to that of Chief Justice Taney in Dred Scott.229 The desire to end an issue, particularly 
one with such divisive consequences for the country, can be overwhelming for judges. It 
is arguable that Blackmun and the majority, under the name of substantive due process 
and guise of legitimate constitutional law, fell vulnerable to the same kind of political 
expediency.  
Griswold, Roe, Planned Parenthood, and the Politicization of the Supreme Court 
 In measuring the extent to which Griswold, Roe, and Planned Parenthood 
contributed to the politicization of the Supreme Court, we return to the familiar analytical 
framework: 
● The degree to which the Court makes controversial decisions that are important to 
the public and inconsistent with the strongly held views of a not insubstantial 
sector of the public, based on a rationale that is obscure. 
● The extent to which the Supreme Court deviates (or appears to deviate) from 
established precedent or modes of judicial interpretation to reach a particular 
result in cases that have broad political implications.    
● The extent to which Supreme Court composition is the focus of political 
processes, including election rhetoric and voting priorities.  
● The extent to which Supreme Court nomination and confirmation is subject to a 
political litmus test, especially at the expense of judicial qualifications and 
expertise.  
● The degree to which Supreme Court justices are polarized along the legal 
spectrum. 
 
 Based on this analytical framework, it would appear that the direct politicizing 
effect of Griswold was negligible. The Connecticut law regulating contraceptive use 
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invalidated in the case was rarely enforced—and, as a direct consequence, even the most 
conservative of the state’s constituents did not gather up in arms as a result of the Court’s 
ruling. And, while the Supreme Court was a major issue in the 1968 election,230 the 
Griswold case was not the focus of that year’s electioneering. Nor did the Supreme Court 
nomination and confirmation processes begin to apply a “Griswold litmus test,” and the 
Griswold decision did not result in lasting schisms or substantive polarization within the 
Court. Indeed, even the democratic process saw very little movement to revitalize aspects 
of the law. Nonetheless, as the first decision to announce a “privacy” right inherent in the 
Fourteenth Amendment, the decision was pivotal to the ultimate resolution of more 
controversial cases.  
 Roe, on the other hand, ranks as a highly (if not the most) politicizing case based 
on all of the factors enumerated above. With respect to the first factor, it is clear that— 
then and now—the country is extremely divided over the issue of abortion. According to 
Harvard Law School Professor Michael Klarman, when it released the Roe decision, “the 
Supreme Court struck down the abortion laws of 46 states and opened the floodgates for 
a wave of opposition that has never abated.”231 Professor Klarman argues that the Court’s 
decision relied heavily on a 1972 poll that concluded 63% of Americans thought abortion 
should be a “private decision between women and their doctors,” although 32 states still 
allowed abortions only when a woman’s life was in danger.232 Of course, the nation had 
not reached such a consensus. In fact, according to an article published by Time titled, “A 
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Stunning Approval for Abortion,” a poll directly prior to the decision demonstrated that 
abolishing first-trimester restrictions was favored among Americans by only one 
percentage point more than those in opposition.233 Thus, while the matter was resolved 
legally, the piece concluded that “it remains a lightning rod for intense national 
debate.”234 
 Indeed, Klarman argues that, in large part, politicizing Supreme Court cases have 
occurred in the latter half of the 20th century because the progressive bench was too far 
ahead of the rest of the country.235 This conclusion is also promoted by scholars such as 
William Eskridge, who contends that the Supreme Court’s issuance of such a far-
reaching decision led pro-life Americans to explore other, more extreme measures in 
order to accomplish their policy goals outside the traditional democratic arena.236 In 
overstepping its bounds, the Court not only confounded legislatures across the country 
with an impracticable trimester framework to assess the constitutional validity of state 
regulation, but also strengthened the ferocity of pro-life activist movements.  
 Furthermore, the rationale expressed in Roe concerning the “right to privacy” was 
quite obscure. The Court failed to adequately or definitively articulate the theories’ 
limitations, which explains why many, including Justice White, found the decision to 
represent “an exercise of raw judicial power.”237 The vagueness of Justice Blackmun’s 
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private liberty interest in Roe was perhaps only superseded by Justice Kennedy’s “heart 
of liberty” passage. It can hardly be said that the Framers (or even a substantial block of 
the American public) were comfortable with the judiciary deciding contentious matters 
on the grounds of what constitutes a sufficiently important “mystery of the universe.” 
 The second factor assesses the extent to which the Supreme Court deviates (or 
appears to deviate) from established precedent or modes of judicial interpretation to reach 
a particular result. In fact, a good argument can be made that the Court’s failure to 
articulate a clear and easily understood rationale for its decision has contributed to the 
ongoing controversy. While the reaction to Roe was undoubtedly due in large part to the 
controversial nature of abortion, it is also in part explained by the lack of clear textual 
support in the Constitution for the Court’s expansive reading of the Due Process Clause.  
Supposedly, privileges protected by substantive due process fall under a category 
of “fundamental” rights. These are, in theory, practices so intrinsically vital to the human 
or American experience that their deprivation—regardless of the legal process by which 
they are taken—constitutes a blatant affront to natural law. In light of the robust 
controversy surrounding the issue of abortion, how could the Court reasonably conclude 
that a women’s right to a first trimester abortion was “fundamental” in this sense? 
 Under the name of “natural rights” and with little textual grounding for its claims, 
the 7-2 majority appeared to much of the American public as ivory tower progressives 
who simply “knew better” than the people themselves. And despite remarkably consistent 
political division over the morality of abortion, the Warren, Burger, and Rehnquist Courts 
would use the framework adopted in Roe to overturn spousal notification, parental 
consent, and informed consent requirements. In this manner, more than 40 years before 
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Obergefell v. Hodges (2015), the Court opened itself to a judicial “slippery slope” that 
would provide fodder for conservative attacks for decades. Indeed, the nuts, bolts, and 
runway were far more slippery than anticipated. 
 Even those who defend the ultimate outcome, such as legal scholars Heymann 
and Barzelay, note that the valid underlying “principles” elucidated by Justice 
Blackmun’s majority opinion were: 
never adequately articulated by the opinion of the Court… [which] leaves the 
impression that the abortion decisions rest in part on unexplained precedents, in 
part on an extremely tenuous relation to provisions of the Bill of Rights, and in 
part on a raw exercise of judicial fiat.238 
 
And, while this thesis disagrees that the principles themselves were acceptable, the point 
still holds that the poorly constructed argument itself further strengthened the case of the 
Court’s detractors, leaving the institution open to charges that the decision was a political 
rather than judicial one.  
 Third, Roe had—and continues to have—an enormous impact on both election 
rhetoric and political processes. Interestingly, though, it appears it took some time for the 
Republican Party to formalize itself as the “pro-life” party. In fact, the 1976 Republican 
Party Platform was relatively nuanced on the issue: 
The question of abortion is one of the most difficult and controversial of our 
time…. There are those in our Party who favor complete support for the Supreme 
Court decision which permits abortion on demand. There are others who share 
sincere convictions that the Supreme Court's decision must be changed by a 
constitutional amendment prohibiting all abortions. Others have yet to take a 
position, or they have assumed a stance somewhere in between polar positions…. 
The Republican Party favors a continuance of the public dialogue on abortion and 
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supports the efforts of those who seek enactment of a constitutional amendment to 
restore protection of the right to life for unborn children.239 
 
To the nation’s surprise, it was a former movie star who capitalized on the increasingly 
organized political movement around abortion and the Court system. According to 
Klarman: 
Roe v. Wade generated a politically potent right-to-life movement that helped 
elect Ronald Reagan president in 1980 and has significantly influenced national 
politics ever since.240 
 
Alongside pledging to nominate the first woman justice to the Supreme Court, the former 
California Governor also promised his fellow Republicans to appoint someone who 
would help overturn the Roe decision, as well as those that prohibited prayer in 
schools.241 Indeed, political mobilization around figures such as Jerry Falwell, founder of 
the Moral Majority coalition, was robust in the 1980s, and the organization’s support of 
Reagan was both early and fervent.242  
 Interestingly, as Governor of the Golden State, Reagan himself had signed 
legislation loosening restrictions for abortion procedures.243 And, as President, Reagan’s 
judicial appointments, particularly those to the Supreme Court, were not all subject to the 
kind of “litmus test” we see today. Justice O’Connor, for example, had a mixed record 
while in Arizona politics and, in his personally diary, Reagan wrote of the soon-to-be 
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Justice: "Called Judge O'Connor and told her she was my nominee for Supreme Court. 
Already the flak is starting and from my own supporters. Right to Life people say she is 
pro abortion. She declares abortion is personally repugnant to her. I think she'll make a 
good Justice."244 However, the religious right was furious.  
 Reverend Falwell warned that the “church people could leave him [Reagan] in 
droves,”245 while the head of the National Pro-life Political Action Committee, Peter 
Gemma Jr., regarded the nomination as a “contradiction to the Republican Party 
Platform” and “everything that candidate Reagan said and even President Reagan has 
said in regard to social issues.”246 Despite impending party realignment over social 
issues, it appears the religious right did not yet have the power in the 1980s it does today 
to institute a “political litmus” test for Supreme Court justices.  
 However, it is clear President Reagan’s opposition to abortion grew more 
pronounced as his presidency went on. In 1983, he published the first book written by a 
sitting President, “Abortion and the Conscience of a Nation:” 
Make no mistake, abortion-on-demand is not a right granted by the Constitution. 
No serious scholar, including one disposed to agree with the Court’s result, has 
argued that the framers of the Constitution intended to create such a right. Shortly 
after the Roe v. Wade decision, Professor John Hart Ely, now Dean of Stanford 
Law School, wrote that the opinion “is not constitutional law and gives almost no 
sense of an obligation to try to be.” Nowhere do the plain words of the 
Constitution even hint at a “right” so sweeping as to permit abortion up to the 
time the child is ready to be born. Yet that is what the Court ruled.247 
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Reagan went on to compare the audacity of the Court’s sweeping decision to Dred Scott, 
connect abortion to infanticide, and cite the Declaration of Independence in both his 
moral and judicial arguments against the Roe decision as well as those who support the 
alleged “right to choose.”248 From then on, Reagan’s first-choice appointments would be 
more stringent on the issue. Of course, only Justice Antonin Scalia (again, not receiving a 
single dissenting vote from the Senate), and not Robert Bork, would make the initial cut. 
Only as a consequence of Bork’s Senate rejection would Ronald Reagan nominate 
Anthony Kennedy, who would be much more sympathetic to “privacy” issues during his 
tenure.  
 As time has passed since Roe, the decision has created perhaps the most 
unbreakable “litmus test” for Democratic and Republican nominees alike. Today, it is 
hard to imagine a Democrat nominating a Justice to the highest Court in the land without 
a clear record affirming women’s “right to choose.” Similarly, the far-right evangelical 
vote remains a strong voice in the Republican Party. While it appears conservative 
Presidents have failed to adequately vet justices on this issue in the past, the appointment 
of Justice Gorsuch may mark a trend towards more stringent consistency in this regard.  
 Finally, the degree to which justices are politicized along the legal spectrum when 
it comes to abortion merits careful consideration. When Roe was initially announced, no 
decision went so boldly against public opinion on a contentious social issue. By the time 
of Planned Parenthood v. Casey, the Court ended with a more moderate outcome—one 
that upheld certain restrictions on abortion while negating others. However, while some 
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have lauded the decision as a kind of compromise on a difficult matter, the push and pull 
of various interests regarding public policy should be the product of the legislative realm.  
To a justice who prioritizes the letter of the law, there can be no such “wiggle 
room.” In other words, a moderate may simply be someone who rules in accordance with 
“what is halfway between what the text means and what she would like it to mean.”249 
While this may be a means of decreasing the “gap” between justices on the legal 
spectrum in accordance with various quantitative metrics, upholding the “essential” 
holding in Roe effectively meant that the justices were no less polarized than in 1973. Of 
course, this was well exemplified by Justice Scalia’s dissent.  
Sodomy, Same-Sex Marriage, and Substantive Due Process 
 In Bowers v. Hardwick (1986), the Court ruled that the Fourteenth Amendment 
did not imply a fundamental right to same-sex sodomy. However, it appears that the 
Court’s stringent adherence to the doctrine of stare decisis articulated in Casey (1992) 
was to be selectively applied since, in 2003, the Court reversed its Bowers precedent in 
Lawrence v. Texas. The question must be asked: Were the justices in the Bower decision 
more or less knowledgeable than the majority in Lawrence about what constituted 
“fundamental rights?” Of course not, but societal views (and especially the opinions of 
the “liberal elite”) had changed drastically. And while the Court’s decision was consistent 
with the direction of the nation, its leap ahead reflected extraordinary impatience—not to 
mention disregard for the democratic process—that further politicized its role within our 
governing scheme.  
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Bowers v. Hardwick (1986) 
In delivering the opinion of the Court in Bowers v. Hardwick (1986), Justice 
White drew a distinction between the previous privacy cases the Court had ruled upon 
and the case at bar. In doing so, he explored what is meant by a “fundamental” right 
protected by substantive due process. First, he turned to a case not discussed at length in 
this thesis, Palko v. Connecticut (1937), which stated that the rights protected by the 
doctrine are those implicit in the concept of “ordered liberty.”250 Furthermore, in Moore 
v. East Cleveland (1977), which dealt with a due process privacy claim involving zoning 
ordinances and the “sanctity of the family,” the Court declared that fundamental rights 
must be "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition."251 Since same-sex sodomy 
was outlawed by all thirteen states during ratification of the Bill of Rights and the 
practice had largely been regarded as a moral perversion since that time, Justice White 
contended that the Court was not: 
inclined to take a more expansive view of our authority to discover new 
fundamental rights embedded in the Due Process Clause. The Court is most 
vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals with judge-made 
constitutional law having little or no cognizable roots in the language or design of 
the Constitution.252  
 
On these grounds, the Court’s majority opinion firmly ruled that the alleged 
constitutional right to engage in same-sex sodomy was “facetious, at best.”253 
 Joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens, Justice Blackmun delivered 
the dissenting opinion. At the core of his argument was the assertion that the “private 
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sphere” of liberty inherent in the Fourteenth Amendment is broader than that implied in 
the majority opinion: “We protect those rights not because they contribute, in some direct 
and material way, to the general public welfare, but because they form so central a part of 
an individual's life.”254 Engaging in intimate behavior with another human being, Justice 
Blackmun argued, is a vital part of the human experience. Insofar as there is no material 
or moral difference between heterosexual and homosexual relations, the ability to engage 
in such conduct should be uniform. And, especially since the Georgia law applied to both 
heterosexual and homosexual sodomy, the Court should have struck it down on those 
grounds.  
Furthermore, in a footnote, Justice Blackmun went on to equate the case at hand 
to Loving v. Virginia (1967), which legalized interracial marriage.255 Resting on religious 
arguments and the fact that many states prohibited interracial marriage when the 
Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, the state of Virginia argued that the races should not 
mix with respect to the marriage institution. According to the dissenting justices in 
Bowers, then, viewing fundamental rights through a purely historical lens led to 
unacceptable consequences (of course, Loving was largely decided on equal protection—
rather than substantive due process—grounds).  
Similarly, Justice Blackmun argued in a footnote that one (albeit not the primary) 
reasons the Court struck down the Connecticut General Statute prohibiting contraception 
to married couples in Griswold was that enforcement of the law would almost certainly  
represent an unreasonable search.256 In a similar manner, regulating sexual relations—
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homosexual or otherwise—would necessarily require state intrusion into the bedrooms of 
average Americans not otherwise charged with a crime. The question must be asked, 
then, is it possible for the state to proactively enforce such a policy without 
“unreasonably” surveilling its citizens? Thus, there were other potential grounds on 
which the Court could have struck down the Georgia sodomy law. Rightly or wrongly, 
the Court would overturn the Bowers ruling 17 years later.  
Lawrence v. Texas (2003) 
 In Lawrence, the Court declared that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process 
Clause implied a substantive component that was broad enough to encompass intimate 
homosexual relations between consenting adults. In response to a reported weapons 
disturbance, officers in Houston, Texas entered the home of John Geddes Lawrence and 
arrested him (alongside his sexual partner) for “deviate sexual behavior,” in violation of 
Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 21.06(a).257 After losing the case in the Court of Appeals for the 
Fourteenth Texas District, the petitioners were granted writ of certiorari to the Supreme 
Court. 
The 5-4 majority opinion authored by Justice Kennedy struck down the laws of 13 
states and declared that, in line with the individual liberty interest articulated in 
Eisenstadt v. Baird (1972), the right to engage in intimate sexual relations fell under a 
similar umbrella. Justice Kennedy proceeded to define the “liberty interest” broadly: 
To say that the issue in Bowers was simply the right to engage in certain sexual 
conduct demeans the claim the individual put forward, just as it would demean a 
married couple were it to be said marriage is simply about the right to have sexual 
intercourse.258 
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Justice Kennedy thus made the case about more than sexual behavior, but about 
“dignity.” In this manner, the Court formally departed its substantive due process 
jurisprudence from one remotely tied to “ordered liberty,” deeply embedded traditions 
and institutions, or even the elusive concept of “privacy.” And, while Justice Kennedy’s 
Casey opinion was the first to articulate such a broad concept of implied liberty with his 
“mystery of human life” paragraph, Lawrence further enlarged the protection afforded to 
include the notion of “respect” for the individual: 
It suffices for us to acknowledge that adults may choose to enter upon this 
relationship in the confines of their homes and their own private lives and still 
retain their dignity as free persons. When sexuality finds overt expression in 
intimate conduct with another person, the conduct can be but one element in a 
personal bond that is more enduring. The liberty protected by the Constitution 
allows homosexual persons the right to make this choice.259 
 
Thus, it was the dignity to explore an intimate, “enduring bond” free of prosecution from 
a governing entity that formed the basis of the Court’s opinion. From this angle, it is clear 
how Lawrence foreshadowed the extension of due process protection to homosexual 
marriage. 
 Joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Thomas, Justice Scalia wrote the primary 
dissenting opinion, which, among other things, underscored the importance of allowing 
the democratic process to run its course: 
What Texas has chosen to do is well within the range of traditional democratic 
action, and its hand should not be stayed through the invention of a brand-new 
"constitutional right" by a Court that is impatient of democratic change. It is 
indeed true that "later generations can see that laws once thought necessary and 
proper in fact serve only to oppress," and when that happens, later generations can 
repeal those laws. But it is the premise of our system that those judgments are to 
be made by the people, and not imposed by a governing caste that knows best.260 
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Interestingly, from the time Bowers was decided, the number of states with the kind of 
sexual sodomy laws that Lawrence overturned fell from 25 to 13.261 Thus, Justice 
Kennedy was indeed correct that society generally had begun to demonstrate an 
“emerging awareness” that sex between consenting adults should be a private matter. 
However, as argued by the dissenting opinion, how could an “emerging awareness” 
possibly become a right “deeply embedded” in our traditions and culture as a society? 
Rather than allowing citizens to debate and persuade each other to embrace a more 
nuanced, genuine path to mutual understanding and respect for the gay community, the 
Court simply mandated it (or at least attempted to). While perhaps an effective means of 
furthering the socially progressive consensus that the nation would come to realize, the 
“natural rights” argument put forth by the majority ultimately rested on precarious 
footing and carefully selected precedent. 
 Justice Scalia warned in his dissenting Lawrence opinion not to believe the 
majority’s assurance that the case “does not involve whether the government must give 
formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter.”262 In one 
of his many clever lines, he continued: 
This case “does not involve” the issue of homosexual marriage only if one 
entertains the belief that principle and logic have nothing to do with the decisions 
of this Court. Many will hope that, as the Court comfortingly assures us, this is 
so.263 
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Thus, while many legal scholars did not anticipate Roe resulting from Griswold or 
Lawrence from Casey, the existence (and speed) of the slippery slope had become 
abundantly clear to proponents of a restrained judiciary by the start of the 21st century.  
Obergefell v. Hodges (2015) 
 In Obergefell, the Court consolidated and granted writ of certiorari to cases from 
Michigan, Kentucky, Ohio, and Tennessee, which had all defined marriage as a 
contractual union between one man and one woman.264 At issue were the following two 
questions: 1) whether the Fourteenth Amendment requires states to issue marriage 
licenses to couples of the same sex, 2) whether a state that does not authorize the issuance 
of marriage licenses to homosexual is required to recognize the validity of such a license 
issued by another state. Again, as in Planned Parenthood v. Casey and Lawrence v. 
Texas, Justice Kennedy authored the Opinion of the Court. In doing so, he articulated 
four fundamental principles that form the foundation of the Court’s decision declaring a 
right of same-sex marriage: 1) that “the right to personal choice regarding marriage is 
inherent in the concept of individual autonomy; 2) the marriage relationship is “a two-
person union unlike any other;” 3) the marriage relationship “safeguards children and 
families and thus draws meaning from related rights of childrearing, procreation, and 
education, and 4; that “marriage is a keystone of our social order.”265 Throughout the rest 
of his opinion, it appears that the equal protection clause was employed primarily in its 
connection to substantive due process. The relationship between the equal protection and 
                                                 
264 Obergefell v. Hodges,  576 U.S. 1 (2015) 
265 Id. 3-4.  
  
 
107 
 
Due Process Clauses (and therefore the equality and liberty more generally) was 
intertwined. 
 In what appears to have become characteristic of Justice Kennedy’s views 
regarding the application of substantive due process cases, the majority opinion stated:  
The nature of marriage is that, through its enduring bond, two persons together 
can find other freedoms, such as expression, intimacy, and spirituality. This is true 
for all persons, whatever their sexual orientation.266 
 
 Again, the dignity to explore this relationship to its fullest potential formed the root of 
what makes the two-person marriage generally (and, as applied in this case, same-sex 
marriage) a fundamental right. Of course, as simply explained by Justice Thomas in his 
dissenting opinion, there is no “Dignity Clause” in the Fourteenth Amendment.267  
 Just as Theodore Roosevelt argued that the “Bakery Shop” case robbed the 
American public of the right to decide a question of economic policy justly left in the 
legislative arena, Justice Scalia wrote a scathing dissent, articulating his view of the 
threat the majority decision posed to American democracy:  
So it is not of special importance to me what the law says about marriage. It is of 
overwhelming importance, however, who it is that rules me. Today’s decree says 
that my Ruler, and the Ruler of 320 million Americans coast-to-coast, is a 
majority of the nine lawyers on the Supreme Court. The opinion in these cases is 
the furthest extension in fact—and the furthest extension one can even imagine—
of the Court’s claimed power to create “liberties” that the Constitution and its 
Amendments neglect to mention. This practice of constitutional revision by an 
unelected committee of nine, always accompanied (as it is today) by extravagant 
praise of liberty, robs the People of the most important liberty they asserted in the 
Declaration of Independence and won in the Revolution of 1776: the freedom to 
govern themselves.268 
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Thus, it appears that regardless of the era, the Court’s decision to articulate firmly 
justiciable, unenumerated rights has almost always been met with a backlash alleging 
judicial intrusion of democratic processes. Insofar as “natural rights” such as “dignity” 
exist, then, this thesis circles back to a question posed in the first section: Whose role is it 
to define—let alone protect—them?  
Bowers, Lawrence, Obergefell, and the Politicization of the Supreme Court 
Of the cases in this chapter, Lawrence and Obergefell clearly had the most 
politicizing effects. However, to careful observers of the Court’s apparently selective 
adherence to the stare decisis doctrine, Bowers appears to play a consequential (albeit 
indirect) role as well. By choosing to abide the principle in Casey and not Lawrence, the 
Court ironically demonstrated to the American public that observance of stare decisis—if 
not uniform—could delegitimize the institution. Of course, in evoking the doctrine, this is 
precisely what O’Connor and the plurality opinion had sought to avoid. As the only two 
cases in this chapter to strike down state laws, the remainder of the analysis will focus on 
Lawrence v. Texas and Obergefell v. Hodges.  
● The degree to which the Court makes controversial decisions that are important to 
the public and inconsistent with the strongly held views of a not insubstantial 
sector of the public, based on a rationale that is obscure. 
● The extent to which the Supreme Court deviates (or appears to deviate) from 
established precedent or modes of judicial interpretation to reach a particular 
result in cases that have broad political implications.  
● The extent to which Supreme Court composition is the focus of political 
processes, including election rhetoric and voting priorities.  
● The extent to which Supreme Court nomination and confirmation is subject to a 
political litmus test, especially at the expense of judicial qualifications and 
expertise.  
● The degree to which Supreme Court justices are polarized along the legal 
spectrum 
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With respect to the first criteria outlined, it is worth discussing what constitutes a 
“not insubstantial sector of the public.” The nation did indeed shift dramatically with 
respect to its views of sodomy from 1986 to 2003. However, in those states that 
maintained anti-sodomy laws on the books (and perhaps especially those specifically 
targeting homosexual intimacy), religious evangelicals and other social conservatives 
remained steadfast in their desire to repudiate homosexuality as a social ill. Of course, the 
same could be said of constituents in states that had outlawed same-sex marriage. In 
addition, employing the same “heart of liberty” foundation as Casey made the Lawrence 
and Obergefell rationales extremely obscure. 
While the Casey decision enunciated a broad conception of “liberty” inherent in 
the Fourteenth Amendment, its sweeping application to a new, particularly contentious 
subject such as same sex sodomy was novel. Thus, while the precedent may have been 
established, it was far from uniformly recognized as legitimate. In addition, various 
different (and possibly, at times, inconsistent) definitions of what constituted a natural 
right had been entertained by the Court previously. Did the “fundamental right” of liberty 
protected by the Due Process Clause depend on some conception of ordered liberty, 
American traditions or values, or an abstract principle such as “dignity,” “autonomy,”or 
“privacy?” By taking the broadest possible interpretation, the Court could reasonably 
have been said to deviate from (or, at the very least, redefine) judicial norms. 
Third, largely as a result of the Lawrence v. Texas decision, legislators across the 
country considered preemptively amending the Constitution to include a ban on same-sex 
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marriage. Indeed, President Bush supported the Federal Marriage Amendment in 2004.269 
In addition, largely as a response to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ruling in 
2003 that legalized same-sex marriage at the state level, Bush declared in his 2004 State 
of the Union address:  
Activist judges, however, have begun redefining marriage by court order, without 
regard for the will of the people and their elected representatives. On an issue of 
such great consequence, the people's voice must be heard. If judges insist on 
forcing their arbitrary will upon the people, the only alternative left to the people 
would be the constitutional process. Our Nation must defend the sanctity of 
marriage.270 
 
Similar rhetoric concerning the issue would continue in the 2008 and 2012 elections. 
And, when Obergefell was released in 2015, virtually every Republican candidate 
denounced the decision, with Texas Senator Ted Cruz deeming it “naked and 
unadulterated judicial activism.”271 In similarly emphatic fashion, former Arkansas 
Governor Mike Huckabee refused to “acquiesce to an imperial court.”272 Surely, if any of 
these candidates won the Presidency, their judicial nominations to the Supreme Court 
would have included a second “litmus test” alongside that demanded by opponents of 
Roe.  
 Finally, the degree to which justices are polarized along the legal spectrum in 
these cases is abundantly clear from the dissenting opinions. It appears that when it 
comes to “fundamental rights” jurisprudence, either a justice protects some intrinsic 
natural liberty necessary to full realization of the human experience or, as a necessary 
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consequence, deprives the people of their sovereign democratic right to govern 
themselves.  
Section Summation 
 Using the case studies explored in this section, it is clear that substantive due 
process has played an important role in the politicization of the Supreme Court. While 
Dred Scott, Lochner v. New York, and the multitude of “privacy” or “dignity” cases 
analyzed have impacted rhetoric surrounding the institution in different ways, it appears 
clear that the invocation of natural rights to strike down legislation is a particularly 
polarizing way of interpreting the law.  
It should be noted here, then, that there are two ways of understanding this thesis. 
Insofar as one believes that substantive due process jurisprudence is illegitimate from a 
legal standpoint and has significant polarizing effects on the Court, the doctrine should be 
resolutely denounced across the board. However, if it is conceded that natural rights 
jurisprudence has firm (albeit not indisputably clear) legal grounds in addition to 
politicizing repercussions for the judiciary, it appears our Constitution has an inherent, 
serious flaw. This analysis would imply that the Framers failed to adequately define and 
balance the powers of the three branches in the manner we commonly believe they were 
designed (and ought) to function. Thus, regardless of whether one finds natural rights 
jurisprudence legitimate from a purely interpretative standpoint or not, the doctrine of 
substantive due process creates troubling implications for our government’s system of 
powers.  
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Section Four: A Critical Examination of Judicial Politicization 
Moving Forward 
 
Concluding Remarks 
Having explored both the constitutional merits of substantive due process or 
“natural rights jurisprudence” and its politicizing effects, it is necessary now to assess 
how the politicization of today’s Supreme Court should be addressed moving forward. 
Unfortunately, simply prescriptions for large-scale change are often elusive. Nonetheless, 
four approaches are worth careful consideration.  
 First, when appropriate, the Court should employ other constitutional provisions 
in cases concerning an alleged “fundamental liberty” interest. For example, both 
Obergefell and Lawrence could have been decided on the grounds of equal protection, 
rather than substantive due process. The wide-ranging authority to adjudicate along the 
lines of such a broad concept such as “dignity,” or “liberty” implies that, when the Court 
does on these grounds, that the American public are somehow less moral than the justices 
themselves. Such a dynamic is not healthy for the functioning of the branches, and it may 
very well incentivize backlash against the bench.  
 And, while a larger interpretive stretch, Griswold and Lawrence could have been 
decided along unreasonable search and seizure grounds, as well. The text of the Fourth 
Amendment states: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated 273 
 
                                                 
273 U.S. Const. Amend. IV. 
  
 
113 
 
 It should be duly noted that, in both of these cases, law enforcement found the 
defendants in violation of the respective state statues without engaging an unreasonable 
search. However, it would nonetheless have been reasonable for the Supreme Court to 
take the view that this Amendment not only prohibits law enforcement officials from 
intrusively investigating a potentially illegal act without a warrant or reasonable cause, 
but also precludes legislatures from enacting criminal statutes that necessarily depend on 
unreasonable searches to be enforced proactively.274 
 Insofar as no other, suitable textual evidence can be advanced (without 
intellectual distortion, of course), the Court should employ the Bill of Rights provision 
that most clearly suggests the existence of enforceable unenumerated rights: the Ninth 
Amendment. As explored in Section One, there is, at the very least, a comprehensible 
textualist argument for natural rights in the original Bill of Rights. None exists in the 
Fifth or the Fourteenth.  
 It might be argued that, in the end, political actors (legislators, the executive 
branch, interest groups, the media, the public, etc.) do not care what the rationale is 
behind the Court’s rulings. Instead, they focus exclusively on whether or not they are in 
agreement with the outcome. Thus, if other constitutional provisions are used to reach a 
conclusion that some sector of the population deems objectionable, another rationale will 
be used to find fault with the Court’s ruling. Nonetheless, without substantive due 
process, the Court will at least be forced to adjudicate controversial issues on the basis of 
                                                 
274 This interpretation may have adverse implications for searches of other “private” places in enforcing 
other laws. For example, one might reasonably contend if there is no substantive difference between raiding 
an individual’s sock drawer for contraceptives versus heroine. Nonetheless, this paper maintains that the 
“unreasonableness” of the search is dependent on its underlying purpose, rather than simply its location.  
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language that is included in the constitutional text, and employing recognizable principles 
of interpretation.  
Second, to the extent that justices are steadfast in their belief that the Constitution 
mandates Courts to adjudicate natural rights, the liberties protected under substantive due 
process should remain those that are truly necessary to maintain a functioning “scheme of 
ordered liberty.”275 Insofar as a compromise must be reached with regard to natural rights 
jurisprudence, such a standard would limit the scope of the judiciary to decisively end 
robust democratic debate on social issues rightly left for the people to decide.  
 Third, civic engagement and instruction must emphasize the role of the Court as 
neutral arbiter. Rather than promoting the Court as the final tribunal of good versus bad, 
students should be taught at an early age the founding, intended purpose of the federal 
judiciary. While perhaps cliché, a return to the institution’s roots as the “bulwark of a 
limited Constitution,” rather than the defender of broadly (and, often times, inadequately) 
defined principles could be beneficial to tempering its currently politicized state. 
 Finally, the current state of the Supreme Court cannot be understood without a 
firm grasp of our gridlocked political system generally. Distance between the two major 
parties and the public themselves (both ideologically and geographically) is growing. 
Although revitalization and expansion of the scope of substantive due process has 
allowed the Court to rule on questions further outside of its legitimate adjudicative 
sphere, the push for justices who reinforce the doctrine comes from the legislative arena. 
Thus, the highly political nature of judicial nominations as an election issue, polarization 
                                                 
275 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)  
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among the justices themselves, and the other underlying factors contributing to the 
Court’s politicization should not be viewed in a silo. Just as the Framers created a system 
of government in which the legislative, executive, and judicial branches respect one 
another despite their firmly different roles and perspectives, we must begin to try and 
mutually understand where our fellow Americans are coming from both socially and 
economically. 
 If nothing else, the election of President Trump demonstrated the animosity and 
lack of empathy patriots of different political views have come to have for one another. 
This core issue, of course, did not begin with substantive due process. Nonetheless, it 
does influence the polarized nature of our general governing scheme, overall health as a 
society, and sense of companionship with our fellow citizens. Unfortunately, this thesis 
does not propose concrete answers to this perplexing and difficult problem, but merely 
seeks to draw its attention to the politicization of the judiciary generally.  
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